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INTRODUCTION
Why are so many people unwilling to accept the 2010 enactment
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA or the
Act)?1 The obvious fact that many people do not like the law is not,
by itself, an adequate explanation.2 Most proposed laws have op-
ponents, often determined and vociferous ones. Once the law is
passed, however, its opponents tend to shift from general opposition
to more particularized efforts to live with the law, minimize its
impact, or undermine its effectiveness. Continued opposition to the
law itself is a much rarer phenomenon. 
Compare the response to the PPACA with the response to the
other one-thousand page statutory behemoth that the Obama
administration enacted in its first two years, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).3 Dodd-
Frank was hardly an uncontroversial piece of legislation; indeed, it
gored the ox of one of the most powerful interest groups in the
United States.4 Yet it vanished from the public agenda as soon as it
was enacted.5 One can be quite certain that there are literally
thousands of lawyers working assiduously on ways to preserve the
practices that the Dodd-Frank Act attempted to terminate or alter,
and that there are thousands of other business, law, and public
relations executives lobbying the regulatory agencies for favorable
1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code).
2. See, e.g., Matt Bai, Check Back in a Generation to See if the Health Law Withstands
Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2010, at A26 (discussing the ongoing challenges to the
PPACA).
3. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.). See generally VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK
ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 1-6 (2011) (discussing the reasons for
the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and the response to its passage).
4. The American Banking Association has expressed continued objections to the Dodd-
Frank Act. See, e.g., Liz Moyer, Dodd-Frank Bill Complete, Bankers React, FORBES STREET
TALK (June 25, 2010, 12:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/streettalk/2010/06/25/dodd-
frank-bill-complete-bankers-react/.
5. Cf. Maya Jackson Randall & Jessica Holzer, Dodd-Frank Foes Adopt New Tactics,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870401360457624
8982186837122.html (discussing how, after the passage of Dodd-Frank, opponents abandoned
efforts to repeal the law instead opting to attack it “piece by piece”).
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treatment under the new law. But the financial services industry
seems content to rely on these typical responses rather than expend
its literal and figurative capital on an effort to repeal Dodd-Frank.
In contrast, the political opposition to the PPACA has been
intense, not only when it was being debated,6 but also after it was
enacted into law.7 At least twenty-six states have filed lawsuits to
overturn portions of the Act,8 and legislators in a similar number of
states have proposed or incorporated amendments to their state
codes that would preclude its operation.9 Many Republican politi-
cians made their opposition to the Act the primary focus of their
campaigns in the 2010 elections,10 and once elected, used their
majority in the House of Representatives to pass an admittedly
symbolic repeal bill.11 Not content with this gesture, they have con-
tinued their animadversion against the Act, declaring that this
opposition will be the focus of their 2012 campaigns as well.12
6. See STAFF OF THE WASH. POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S NEW
HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 1-2 (2010) [hereinafter LANDMARK].
7. See, e.g., Kevin Sack, G.O.P. Stands on Health Masks Records as Governors, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, at A13 (noting the unanimity of Republican presidential candidates’
opposition to the PPACA).
8. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp.
2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff ’d in part and rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011);
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 656 F.3d
253 (4th Cir. 2011).
9. See, e.g., Virginia Health Care Freedom Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2010). In
addition, some states have attempted to amend their state constitutions to preclude the
PPACA’s application. See, e.g., Press Release, Okla. Office of the Attorney Gen., Oklahoma
Attorney General-Elect Will File Lawsuit Against Federal Health Care Reform Bill (Jan. 7,
2011), available at http://www.oag.state.ok.us/agelect.nsf/press.html.
10. See Kevin Sack, Health Care Vote Puts Democrats on Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
2010, at A20; Seth E. Masket & Steven Greene, When One Vote Matters: The Electoral
Impact of Role Call Votes in the 2010 Elections, Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association, March 30-April 2, 2011, Chicago, IL. at 3 (2011), http://static.usnews.com/
documents/whispers/104076.pdf (“The National Republican Congressional Committee,
meanwhile, ran ads in 31 targeted districts criticizing Democratic incumbents for their
support of the health care reform bill.”); cf. Robert J. Blendon & John M. Blenson, Health Care
in the 2010 Congressional Election, NEW ENG. J. MED. 363, Nov. 11, 2010 (Republican voters
strongly oppose ACA).
11. See Repealing the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act, H.R. 2, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011).
It was symbolic because the Democrat-controlled Senate clearly was not going to enact similar
legislation. See David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Rejects Repeal of Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 2011, at A20. 
12. See Gail Russell Chaddock, Health-Care Repeal Fails in Senate: What’s the Next GOP
Target?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 2, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/
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Potential Republican nominees for President are attempting to
outdo each other in their hostility to the PPACA,13 and a major
disadvantage afflicting Mitt Romney, who might otherwise be the
clear front-runner, is that he is poorly positioned to oppose the
PPACA because he spearheaded similar legislation as Governor of
Massachusetts.14 Perhaps most significantly, the PPACA seems to
have been one of two factors that have led to the remarkably rapid
development of a genuine social movement:15 the now-notorious Tea
Party.16 The Tea Party’s success, in turn, has fueled opposition to
2011/0202/Health-care-repeal-fails-in-Senate-What-s-the-next-GOP-target (“[T]oday’s vote is
only one skirmish in a struggle over the historic law likely to run into 2012 elections—and
especially targeting Senate Democrats up for reelection.”); Herszenhorn, supra note 11
(“Republicans said after the votes that they would persist in their efforts to overturn the law.
Rejecting assertions that the repeal vote was a ‘futile act,’ Senator John Cornyn of Texas, the
chairman of the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee, declared, ‘These are the first
steps in a long road that will culminate in 2012.’”).
13. Mike Glover, GOP Presidential Hopefuls Hammer Health Care, USA TODAY (Mar. 27,
2011, 05:04:20 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2011-03-26-3430543601_x.htm.
14. Theo Emery, Patrick Gives Romney Praise He May Not Want; Lauds His Role in
Health Overhaul, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 28, 2011, at A1 (“Governor Deval Patrick praised Mitt
Romney yesterday for crafting the successful 2006 health care law in Massachusetts,
presenting fresh fodder for Romney’s critics as he struggles to explain to GOP presidential
primary voters why he authored a law that became a model for President Obama’s national
health care overhaul.”); Kevin Sack, Romney on Health Care: A Particular Spin, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 2010, at A12 (“[A]s he appeals to conservative activists and Republican primary
voters, he is trying to draw nuanced distinctions between his Massachusetts law and the
federal legislation that shares many of its fundamental elements, including a requirement
that people have insurance.”). Romney titled his obligatory candidate’s book No Apology. MITT
ROMNEY, NO APOLOGY: THE CASE FOR AMERICAN GREATNESS (2010). In the chapter devoted
to health care, he struggles to explain why he was not really responsible for the
Massachusetts health care law as it emerged; why, in case he was responsible, it is different
from the federal law; and why, regardless of what he did in Massachusetts, he opposes that
federal law and would seek its repeal. Id. at 174, 176-77, 193.
15. That is, the mobilization of people in civil society by policy entrepreneurs or by a
collectively developing awareness. See generally MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATION AGE:
ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE: THE POWER OF IDENTITY (2d ed. 2010) (mobilization by
collectively developing awareness); HANSPETER KRIESI, POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND SOCIAL
CHANGE: THE DUTCH CASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1993) (mobilization by collectively
developing awareness); GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE CRITICAL MASS IN
COLLECTIVE ACTION: A MICRO-SOCIAL THEORY (1993) (mobilization by policy entrepreneurs);
ANTHONY OBERSCHALL, SOCIAL CONFLICT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1973) (mobilization by
policy entrepreneurs); CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION (1978)
(mobilization by policy entrepreneurs); ALAIN TOURAINE, THE VOICE AND THE EYE: AN
ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Alan Duff trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1981) (1978)
(mobilization by collectively developing awareness).
16. See SCOTT RASMUSSEN & DOUG SCHOEN, MAD AS HELL: HOW THE TEA PARTY
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the Act.17 Some of the Republicans who oppose the Act are undoubt-
edly sincere in their personal distaste for it and would oppose it in
any case. But legislators who are insincere provide even more
impressive evidence of the Act’s unpopularity, because they are, in
that case, appealing to an accurately perceived revulsion toward the
Act among their constituents. 
This Article argues that the intense opposition to the PPACA
arises from the realization that the Act represents a genuine
revolution in the way we think about American citizenship and the
nature of our political community.18 In fact, it is a constitutional
revolution, not only in the general sense that it changes the basic
moral structure of our government, but in the specific sense that it
redefines constitutional doctrine, creating new rights that the
Supreme Court will ultimately be called on to enforce. The opposi-
tion to the PPACA is intensified by the further recognition that the
statute’s continued existence is constitutionally relevant. More spe-
cifically, people understand, at some politically visceral level, a
feature of constitutional law that has been underemphasized in the
scholarly literature; namely, that statutes as well as judicial de-
cisions interpret the Constitution.19 Not every statute is relevant to
our understanding of the Constitution, of course, but many signifi-
cant ones are and the PPACA is a prime example. The Act’s passage
suggests that the U.S. Constitution guarantees so-called positive
rights, such as rights to sustenance, decent housing, an adequate
education, and, of course, basic health care.20 The mere fact of its
enactment secures the place of these rights on our political agenda
and encourages the Supreme Court to declare them part of the
Constitution. The Act’s continued existence will intensify these
tendencies. 
MOVEMENT IS FUNDAMENTALLY REMAKING OUR TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 122-23 (2010); KATE
ZERNIKE, BOILING MAD: INSIDE TEA PARTY AMERICA 69 (2010).
17. See RASMUSSEN & SCHOEN, supra note 16, at 122-24.
18. It is thus another factor contributing to the general level of hostility that some sectors
of the American public feel toward the current administration. See JOHN AMATO & DAVID
NEIWERT, OVER THE CLIFF: HOW OBAMA’S ELECTION DROVE THE AMERICAN RIGHT INSANE 136
(2010).
19. See Edward L. Rubin, How Statutes Interpret the Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE
297, 301-02 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/legislation/how-
statutes-interpret-the-constitution/.
20. See id. at 322-23.
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This Article begins by explaining how statutes can be regarded as
interpretations of the Constitution.21 It proceeds to discuss the
concept of positive rights, and the way that constitutional interpre-
tation by statute contributes to the recognition of these rights.22 It
then argues that the PPACA is a statute of this sort and that this is
at least part of the reason why it has aroused such fervent opposi-
tion.23
I. HOW STATUTES INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION
A. The Idea of a Constitution
The standard way of thinking about the relationship between
statutes and the Constitution is that the Constitution establishes a
general framework for permissible governmental action and the
elected government acts within that framework.24 The government
must respect those boundaries or risk having its actions struck
down by a court when it exceeds them. To allow quotidian govern-
mental action to affect the framework itself, it is thought, would
vitiate the entire purpose of having a written constitution.25 This
notion is derived from the contract theory of government, which
emerged during the seventeenth century, finding its most incisive
and memorable advocates in Hobbes and Locke.26 Their view, and
what decisively distinguished their theory from the contractual
theories of government that prevailed during the Middle Ages,27 was
that people in a state of nature exchanged a natural but unsatisfac-
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See Stephen M. Griffin, The Problems of Constitutional Change, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2121,
2127 (1996).
25. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-78 (1803).
26. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 142-44 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1651); JOHN LOCKE,
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 106 (Ian Shapiro ed.,
Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690); see NORBERTO BOBBIO, THOMAS HOBBES AND THE NATURAL LAW
TRADITION 1-73 (Daniela Gobetti trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1993) (1989); C. B. MACPHERSON,
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 263-64 (1962). 
27. On medieval constitutionalism, see Jean Dunbabin, Government, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT c. 350-c. 1450, at 477, 515-19 (J.H. Burns ed.,
1988).
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tory freedom for the advantages of civil order, specifically safety and
prosperity.28 It follows from this mode of thought that the Constitu-
tion was conceived as embodying or codifying such a social
contract.29 To allow governmental action to affect the social contract,
according to this view, would be to violate the contract’s original
terms and destroy its ongoing effect. The people would have
sacrificed their natural freedom for an illusory promise and would
thus be victims of a sort of high-level bait-and-switch scam. 
To see why this account of the U.S. Constitution, conventional
though it may be, does not adequately capture the Constitution’s
meaning, it is necessary to consider a constitution in greater detail.
According to the premodern view, and to premodern contractarian
thought, the state was regarded as an autonomous entity.30 It was
supposed to govern in the interests of the populace, but it was gen-
erally regarded as having a divine origin and exercising God-given
authority.31 The analogy, which was entirely explicit at the time,
was between the state and the family; the king, like the father,
ruled in accordance with a divinely established order.32 This did not
mean that the king himself was chosen by God. Rather, the
prevailing view was that he ruled by consent of the people or, more
specifically, by consent of the nobility or warrior elite.33 Nor did it
mean that the king could do no wrong; like the father, he was
supposed to act in accordance with natural law, that is, the law
established by God and promulgated through human reason.34
28. REINHARD BENDIX, KINGS OR PEOPLE: POWER AND THE MANDATE TO RULE 21-35 (1978).
29. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON: 1783-1787, at 183, 183-91 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
30. See BENDIX, supra note 28, at 191-200; OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE
MIDDLE AGE 32-34 (Frederic William Maitland trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1927) (1900).
31. BENDIX, supra note 28, at 32-33; ANTONY BLACK, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN EUROPE,
1250-1450, at 137-38 (1992); JOSEPH CANNING, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT
300-1450, at 45-47 (1996); GIERKE, supra note 30, at 32-34. 
32. HEINRICH FICHTENAU, LIVING IN THE TENTH CENTURY: MENTALITIES AND SOCIAL
ORDERS 97-98 (Patrick J. Geary trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1991) (1984) (describing the family
structure underlying this analogy); Janet Nelson, Kingship and Empire, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT c. 350-c. 1450, supra note 27, at 211, 219-22.
33. See BLACK, supra note 31, at 104-05; 2 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE AGE OF REFORMATION 162-64 (1978); Dunbabin, supra note
27, at 515.
34. See 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 223-24 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Encyc. Britannica, Inc. rev. vol. 1952) (1485).
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Rather, the divine origin of kingship meant that God established the
office itself and the authority that the office possessed. Although the
king might have obtained his position by popular consent or
historical circumstance, the legitimacy of that position derived from
God’s design.35 Thus the king’s regime—the government—had an
autonomous basis; it was not a human mechanism or device.36
Pragmatic developments and theoretical considerations supported
the idea that government is an autonomous entity. By the end of the
Early Middle Ages, kings were functioning as private persons whose
position resulted from their location at the top of the feudal hier-
archy.37 Accordingly, members of the high nobility were vassals of
the king, bound to him by a personal pledge of loyalty, just as these
nobles themselves had vassals bound to them by the same means.38
Even Charlemagne, although he attempted to recapture the Roman
imperium, demanded that all the nobles of his extensive realm take
an oath of loyalty to him as their feudal lord.39 The essence of a
feudal lord’s status was autonomy, which distinguished him from
the great mass of unfree serfs; his constraints were his obligations
to his overlord.40 The king, who had no overlord, was thus entirely
autonomous.
The nation-state developed from the feudal monarchy.41 As it did,
it assumed features that were increasingly related to its public
functions. The king’s household was gradually transformed into the
35. See BLACK, supra note 31, at 137-39.
36. This view was not universal; a notable exception is found in the writings of Marsilius
of Padua. See MARSILIUS OF PADUA, THE DEFENDER OF THE PEACE 44 (Annabel Brett ed. &
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (1324). Marsilius, however, was “condemned as a heretic”
on the basis of his views. Paul E. Sigmund, Jr., Note, The Influence of Marsilius of Padua on
15th-Century Conciliarism, 23 J. HIST. IDEAS 392, 392 (1962).
37. 2 MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY: SOCIAL CLASSES AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 383
(L. A. Manyon trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1961) (1939); FICHTENAU, supra note 32, at 157-59;
CHRIS WICKHAM, THE INHERITANCE OF ROME: A HISTORY OF EUROPE FROM 400 TO 1000, at 450-
51 (2009).
38. See, e.g., F. L. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM 74-75 (Philip Grierson trans., Langmans, Green
& Co. 1952) (1944).
39. Id. at 30-32.
40. Id. at 74-75.
41. See generally THOMAS ERTMAN, BIRTH OF THE LEVIATHAN: BUILDING STATES AND
REGIMES IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN EUROPE 35-89 (1997) (reviewing the origins of
patrimonial absolutism in Latin Europe).
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machinery of governance.42 His secretary, who was responsible for
the signet ring—by which he signed or authenticated documents
—became a secretary of state, responsible for a range of domestic
affairs.43 The marshal, who was in charge of the king’s stable,
became a military commander, the predecessor of the modern
European field marshal.44 In England, the reeve, who managed the
land that the king owned as private property, was assigned to
manage affairs in the shires and became the shire reeve, or sheriff.45
But, with the exception of England, the increasingly public nature
of monarchies was accompanied by the growth of royal absolutism
that reaffirmed the king’s autonomy in the face of his growing public
responsibilities.46 Thus, hardworking, conscientious monarchs like
Philip II and Louis XIV built the Escorial and Versailles as their
private residences because they, together with their residences,
embodied the state as a separate entity.47 As Louis is famously said
to have declared: “I am the State.”48
The evolution of political theory paralleled these developments.
The idea that kingship, and thus government, was divinely or-
dained as an autonomous institution prevailed well into the
seventeenth century.49 In fact, Lutheran thought maintained that
42. See Wolfram Fischer & Peter Lundgreen, The Recruitment and Training of
Administrative and Technical Personnel, in THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN
EUROPE 456, 467-68 (Charles Tilly ed., 1975); see generally ERNEST BARKER, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1660-1930 (Archan Books 1966)
(1944); T. F. TOUT, CHAPTERS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND: THE
WARDROBE, THE CHAMBER AND THE SMALL SEALS 19 (reprt. ed. 1967); W.L. WARREN, HENRY
II, at 306-08 (1973).
43. See TOUT, supra note 42, at 30.
44. See RICHARD MORTIMER, ANGEVIN ENGLAND 1154-1258, at 16 (1994); WARREN, supra
note 42, at 306.
45. See HELEN M. JEWELL, ENGLISH LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES 183
(1972); JOSEPH R. STRAYER, ON THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE 28 (1970).
46. See JAMES B. COLLINS, THE STATE IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE 79-80 (1995); ERTMAN,
supra note 41, at 89-90; DAVID OGG, EUROPE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 281-322 (8th rev.
ed. 1961).
47. See J.H. ELLIOT, IMPERIAL SPAIN, 1469-1716, at 246-48 (1963) (describing the reign of
Philip II and Escorial); GARRETT MATTINGLY, THE ARMADA 73 (1959) (same); G.R.R.
TREASURE, SEVENTEENTH CENTURY FRANCE: A STUDY OF ABSOLUTISM 286-87 (Anchor Books
ed. 1967) (1966) (describing the reign of Louis XIV and the palace of Versailles).
48. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 492 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 6th ed. 2004).
49. See WILLIAM J. BOUWSMA, THE WANING OF THE RENAISSANCE, 1550-1640, at 227-29
(2000); TREASURE, supra note 47, at 301-03.
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kings themselves were chosen by God.50 Machiavelli’s notorious
realism secularized only the strategy that kings should adopt, not
the institution of monarchy itself.51 Even in England, which was
moving in the opposite direction from continental absolutism,
divine-right monarchy remained the dominant position,52 and the
concept was propounded in a book written by no less a person than
the king himself.53 Hobbes, often regarded as the first modern
political theorist, broke with this tradition by arguing that govern-
ment emerged from a social contract among the people subject to its
rule.54 Although he reached the same conclusion regarding the
powers of government as did the divine right theorists, the Restora-
tion monarchy deeply distrusted his approach because the revolu-
tionary implications of that approach were so apparent.55
With Locke, those revolutionary implications were translated into
pragmatic political positions.56 Locke posited that if government is
created by the people through the social contract, then it can
properly be regarded as a device or mechanism of the people to
achieve their collective goals.57 As such, government is no longer
part of God’s design but rather a human creation, and the ruler is
no longer an autonomous entity but instead a servant of the
people.58 In other words, Locke envisioned the state as an instru-
mental, rather than a deontological entity. It was no longer an end
in itself but a means of achieving ends that are separately deter-
50. See SKINNER, supra note 33, at 15-16.
51. See generally NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES (Luigi Ricci
trans., Modern Library 1940) (1532).
52. For the classic statement, see generally ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA AND OTHER
WRITINGS (Johann P. Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1680).
53. See KING JAMES VI AND I: POLITICAL WRITINGS 63-64 (Johann P. Sommerville ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1549). To be sure, James wrote this when he was James VI of
Scotland, but his views remained the same when he acceded to the English throne as James
I. See LEANDA DE LISLE, AFTER ELIZABETH: THE RISE OF JAMES OF SCOTLAND AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE THRONE OF ENGLAND 47-48 (2005); DAVID TEEMS, MAJESTIE: THE KING
BEHIND THE KING JAMES BIBLE 122-23 (2010).
54. HOBBES, supra note 26, at 142-44.
55. See A. P. MARTINICH, HOBBES: A BIOGRAPHY 223-25, 227 (1999); see also Gordon J.
Schochet, Intending (Political) Obligation: Hobbes and the Voluntary Basis of Society, in
THOMAS HOBBES AND POLITICAL THEORY 55 (Mary G. Dietz ed., 1990).
56. See generally LOCKE, supra note 26. The Second Treatise can be read as a critique of
Hobbes. Id. at 7-8, 100.
57. Id. at 154-57.
58. Id. at 166.
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mined by the needs or desires of the citizens who constitute it.59
Rousseau advanced this position in his Social Contract,60 but his
notion that the government should serve the people’s general
will—essentially their altruistic inclinations—rather than their
personal interests, coupled with his rejection of representative
democracy, circles back to the idea of an autonomous state.61 
Shortly after the publication of Rousseau’s Social Contract in
1762, the idea that the state should serve the interests of its
citizens, as individuals, was forcefully—if briefly—expressed in the
Declaration of Independence. The Declaration’s best-known lan-
guage says: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.62 
The “unalienable Rights” language attracts attention due to its
moral force, as does the “consent of the governed” language, which
remains one of the two main justifications for democracy.63 But most
significant for present purposes is the idea that the government is
specifically defined as a device for securing people’s rights, and
nothing else. The Declaration goes on, in slightly less famous lan-
guage, to explain: 
59. Id.
60. See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Willmoore Kendall
trans., Henry Regnery Co. 1954) (1762).
61. See PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: THE SCIENCE OF FREEDOM 548-51 (1969); J.B.
SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 474-
80 (1998); Jeremy Jennings, Rousseau, Social Contract and the Modern Leviathan, in THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT FROM HOBBES TO RAWLS 115, 115-16 (David Boucher & Paul Kelly eds.,
1994).
62. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
63. See generally DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986) (presenting a consent-
based theory of morality); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (proposing consent-based
principles for the structure of society). The other justification is deliberative democracy. See
generally AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996);
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF
LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992).
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That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it,
and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such
principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them
shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.64
These stirring words were translated into pragmatic political
terms some thirteen years later in the United States Constitution.
Its Preamble, which is equally familiar, states: 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.65
As in the Declaration, government is envisioned in the Preamble as
a device that the people adopt for specific purposes relating
exclusively to their individual well being. The wars that previous
European monarchs had pursued to win glory are translated into
the goal of providing for the defense of the nation and its population.
Aside from defense, the specified purposes are promoting justice,
tranquility, and general welfare—all benefits for individuals—and
the whole document is presented as an action taken by the people. 
This, then, is what it means to have a constitution: the govern-
ment is not an autonomous entity but a device to serve the people
whom it governs. Government is constituted—created ab initio—as
such a device. A natural implication of a constitution’s primacy is
that it places constraints on the actions that the government is
permitted to adopt.66 These constraints are enormously important,
as I have argued elsewhere,67 but they do not define a constitu-
tion’s basic meaning. An autonomous monarch, like William III of
England, might be bound by specific provisions, such as the 1689
64. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
65. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
66. See Edward Rubin, Judicial Review and the Right to Resist, 97 GEO. L.J. 61, 62-63
(2008) (discussing judicial review as a type of constraint on the rules of a political entity).
67. See id. at 97-98 (arguing that without judicial review, ruling branches would not have
to submit to any higher law).
2012] THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1651
Declaration of Rights limiting the king’s authority68 or the Settle-
ment Act of 1701 prohibiting the king from removing judges at
will.69 But a government conceived as an instrumentality, a device
for serving the people, could be established only by an explicit set of
rules that defined all of its powers and procedures. 
From this account of a constitution’s basic meaning, one can see
that the social contract was not essential to the conception of
modern constitutionalism; rather, the social contract was a means
by which political theorists mediated between that conception and
its essentially medieval predecessor. If the idea of a social contract
captured a constitution’s essence, then the people could contract
away all of their rights, thus destroying the government’s instru-
mental character and restoring its autonomous authority. This is,
of course, what Hobbes thought,70 and why his theory, despite its
historical importance, sounds so discordant to modern ears. Even
more basically, the instrumentalism of government is an ongoing
relationship, not an initial agreement. The point is not simply that
the idea of a social contract is a fantasy, as Hume pointed out,71 but
that it is an inapplicable fantasy. It fails to capture the way that a
true instrumentality must be continually adapted and transformed
to meet the purposes or interests of those whom it is intended to
serve. At most, the concept of the social contract makes the gov-
ernment an instrumentality of those who wrote the constitution;
this means that once the original generation is gone, the govern-
ment is not an instrumentality of anyone at all. 
The implicit recognition of this disjunction between social con-
tractarianism and modern constitutional thought led both Hegel
and Bentham to dismiss contractarianism as irrelevant,72 and
68. See STEVE PINCUS, 1688: THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION 292-93 (2009).
69. Todd D. Peterson, Congressional Investigations of Federal Judges, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1,
39-40 (2004) (discussing the Settlement Act of 1701 and its influence on the Framers of the
U.S. Constitution).
70. See generally HOBBES, supra note 26.
71. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 533-36 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739); DAVID HUME, OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT (1748), reprinted
in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU 207, 215-16 (Oxford Univ. Press
1946); see Dario Castiglione, History, Reason and Experience: Hume’s Arguments Against
Contract Theories, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT FROM HOBBES TO RAWLS, supra note 61, at 95. For
an interestingly unconventional view of Hume’s approach to this subject, see David Gauthier,
David Hume, Contractarian, 88 PHIL. REV. 3 (1979).
72. JEREMY BENTHAM, A Fragment on Government, in A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES
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subsequent thinkers have tended to agree with their assessment.73
Social contract theory was not revived in any significant way until
Rawls.74 But Rawls’s version of the theory is distinctly different
from the seventeenth-century approach. This is not because he
makes the contract entirely hypothetical or conceptual in response
to Hume—Kant did that75—but because the agreement people reach
in the original position, behind the veil of ignorance, does not
constitute the government; rather, it establishes the principles of
justice.76 In Rawls’s framework, it is only when people begin to
emerge from behind the veil and take account of the specific world
in which they will be living that they are able to draft a con-
stitution.77 Thus, they are no longer creating a government from
some state of nature or original position, as social contract theory
would require; rather, they are constructing specific governmental
institutions in light of their actual circumstances, which is an
entirely different conception.
AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 393, 439-46 (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., Univ. of
London Athlone Press 1977) (1796); G. W. F. HEGEL, OUTLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
84-93 (Stephen Houlgate ed., T. M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1821). Both argue
that the obligations arising from a social contract depend on the institution of promise
keeping, which is a product of society rather than a basis for its creation; thus, social contract
theory cannot contradict, or provide an alternative to, the real justification for government,
which in Bentham’s case is utility, and in Hegel’s is rational will. See BENTHAM, supra, at 446-
48; HEGEL, supra, at 56-59, 92-93.
73. See, e.g., David Boucher & Paul Kelly, The Social Contract and Its Critics: An
Overview, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT FROM HOBBES TO RAWLS, supra note 61, at 1, 17-18.
74. RAWLS, supra note 63, at 11-17. For a subsequent effort to use contract theory in its
theoretical or hypothetical form as a basis of morality, see GAUTHIER, supra note 63, at 9-11.
75. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 92-93 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1799). Kant, who generally would not advance an argument
unless he felt that it would withstand Hume’s skepticism, argues that the social contract is
not an historical event, but a way of representing the terms on which a rational person would
agree to submit herself to government control. Rawls follows this theoretical approach.
RAWLS, supra note 63, at 11-12 & n.5; see also id. at 142-50.
76. RAWLS, supra note 63, at 136-42.
77. Id. at 196-97 (“Thus I suppose that after the parties have adopted the principles of
justice in the original position, they move to a constitutional convention.... Since the
appropriate conception of justice has been agreed upon, the veil of ignorance is partially
lifted.... [T]hey now know the relevant general facts about their society, that is, its natural
circumstances and resources, its level of economic advance and political culture, and so on.”);
see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 334-40 (1993).
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B. The Purposes of a Constitution
If a government structured by a constitution—that is, a consti-
tuted government—is conceived as an instrumentality for serving
the people, the next question we can ask is how it should do so.
Rousseau thought it should serve the people by embodying their
general will, that is, their communal or altruistic inclinations,
rather than their actual desires.78 By living under a government so
constituted, he argued, human nature would be transformed and
individuals would join together in a moral unity.79 If the government
needed to consult individuals about specific policies, Rousseau
believed, such consultation must be done directly, not through
representatives.80 On this basis, he joined Aristotle81 in arguing that
only a small state, in which the people can be assembled as a group,
can be a just or moral one.82 This second principle is easy for a
constituted nation to reject: a theory that applies only to small
groups is useless for a modern state.83 But the first principle is even
more strongly rejected; if not totalitarian, it is certainly elitist and
authoritarian.84 A constituted state is one in which the government
serves the people by implementing their goals or purposes, not by
conceiving of its own goals in an effort to make the people better.85
If the state does the latter, it is acting autonomously, according to
78. ROUSSEAU, supra note 60, at 38-39.
79. Id. at 56 (“Individuals and public alike need someone to guide them. The former must
be induced to will in line with reason, the latter must be taught to see clearly what it is
willing. When the people has [sic] been taught to do that ... there will be complete cooperation
among the parts and, in the end, maximum strength for the whole.”).
80. Id. at 100.
81. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 403-05 (Trevor J. Saunders ed., T. A. Sinclair trans.,
Penguin Books rev. ed. 1981) (c. 340 B.C.) (concluding that a large polis will compromise the
“essential nature” of the state); see also GIOVANNI SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 250-57
(1962) (discussing the Greek system of “[r]eal self-government” and the concept of the polis).
82. ROUSSEAU, supra note 60, at 101 (“You must have: a) A very small state, in which the
people can easily be assembled, and each citizen can—without going to much trouble—get
acquainted with all the others.”).
83. See JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 17 (New
York, Harper & Bros. 1862).
84. See NANNERL O. KEOHANE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE STATE IN FRANCE: THE RENAISSANCE
TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT 442-49 (1980); Jennings, supra note 61, at 115-19.
85. Note that it is the danger of dictating goals, not the danger of extensive state action
in general, that is the crux of Isaiah Berlin’s argument against “positive liberty.” ISAIAH
BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 132, 165-71 (1969); see
infra Part II.
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its own prerogatives, like premodern kings, who, in at least some
cases, had equally benevolent intentions. It is no longer a mecha-
nism or device that serves the people.86
But what does it mean to serve the people? Who is to determine
what the people’s real goals or purposes are? Democratic theory
provides one answer: the people themselves define their purposes.
Precisely how they do so is a matter of some complexity, of course.
In a large, modern state, they cannot follow Aristotle’s definition of
democracy in which the citizens as a whole make all the important
policy decisions in a general assembly, and the public officials
needed to implement those decisions—and, incidentally, to set the
agenda for the assembly87—are chosen by lot.88 The contemporary
answer, derived from medieval models of collective action,89 is that
the people vote for representatives, who make the basic decisions
and appoint the officials who implement those decisions.90 Particu-
lar mechanisms of representation vary, of course, but the principle
is clear enough. 
Constitutionalism, as a theory of government, certainly allows for
this method of determining the people’s interests, and modern
86. A similar critique can be advanced against Hegel’s noncontractarian theory of the
state. See HEGEL, supra note 72, at 84-86. Hegel was not sympathetic to parliamentary
democracy, but this is probably an unfair reading of his theory. See CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL
439-41 (1975).
87. On the crucial importance of this role, a matter that Aristotle did not consider, see
Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 947, 949, 952
(1962). See also STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 20-29 (2d ed. 2005) (expanding on
Bachrack and Baratz’s analysis).
88. ARISTOTLE, supra note 81, at 361-64. A democracy, he says, has the following features: 
(a) Elections to office by all from among all. (b) Rule of all over each and of each
by turns over all. (c) Offices filled by lot, either all or at any rate those not
calling for experience or skill.... (e) The same man not to hold the same office
twice, or only rarely.... (h) The assembly as the sovereign authority in
everything, or at least the most important matters, officials having no sovereign
power over any, or over as few as possible. 
Id. at 363.
89. See ARTHUR P. MONAHAN, CONSENT, COERCION, AND LIMIT: THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 111-21 (1987); JOHN B. MORRALL, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN
MEDIEVAL TIMES 63-65 (3d ed. 1971); GAINES POST, STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL THOUGHT:
PUBLIC LAW AND THE STATE, 1100-1322, at 61-69 (1964). See generally Gaines Post, A Roman
Legal Theory of Consent, Quod Omnes Tangit, in Medieval Representation, 1950 WIS. L. REV.
66 (discussing the application of the Roman principle of consent to medieval forms of
representation).
90. See NORBERTO BOBBIO, DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF
STATE POWER 149-52 (Peter Kennealy trans., 1989); MILL, supra note 83, at 97-100.
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constitutions, of course, rely on it heavily. In fact, representative
processes have become so well established as a means of determin-
ing the people’s interests that it is now difficult to conceive of a
constitution that establishes any other form of government.91 But
representative democracy is not typically regarded as sufficient, by
itself, to satisfy the demands of constitutionalism, even apart from
the defects in the representative process that public choice scholar-
ship has explored.92 One reason lies in the view that structure
should take precedence over quotidian decision making. If represen-
tatives could be relied upon, without reservation, to govern in the
people’s interests, there would be no reason to prevent those rep-
resentatives from changing the structure of the process by which
decisions are made. That is in fact what occurs in the United
Kingdom, where there is no written constitution.93 
The question, then, is why constitutional regimes reserve the
design of the government’s basic structure to the constitution itself.
The answer lies in the deeper meaning of a constitution, specifically
in its underlying conception of the government as an instrumental-
ity that serves the people’s purposes.94 If the elected representatives
can change the structure of the government, there is no guarantee
that the structure they select will serve the people. In fact, there is
good reason to think that representatives, once elected, will tend to
think of themselves as members of the government and may thus
91. If we go back to the leading political treatises of the ancient world, where
constitutionalism was explicitly discussed, we see that the concept was not linked to
democracy at all. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 81; MARCUS CICERO, The Republic, in THE
REPUBLIC AND THE LAWS 1 (Niall Rudd trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (c. 54 B.C.); PLATO,
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO (John L. Davies & David S. Vaughan trans., MacMillan & Co. 3d ed.
1950) (c. 380 B.C.); see also PLUTARCH, Lycurgus, in LIVES OF THE NOBLE GREEKS 40 (Edward
Fuller ed., Dell Publ’g Co. 1959) (c. 100 B.C.). Aristotle identified six possible regimes that can
be created by constitutions: monarchy, aristocracy, politea (constitutional republic), tyranny,
oligarchy, and democracy. He regarded the last three, including democracy, as perverted
forms of the first three types of government. ARISTOTLE, supra note 81, at 187-96. 
92. See generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003). For an analysis of the
relationship between public choice theory and law, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
93. See, e.g., VERNON BOGDANOR, THE NEW BRITISH CONSTITUTION 10 (2009); ANTHONY
KING, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 5 (2007). References to the British constitution use the term
“constitution” in the more general sense of governmental structure—which every government
of course possesses—not in the sense of a binding, foundational document. See, e.g., KING,
supra, at 2-5.
94. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
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act in the government’s interest rather than in the interest of the
people whom they, in theory, represent.95 The same reasoning,
however, applies to the decisions that they make within the
structure established by the constitution. No structure can guaran-
tee that elected representatives will always act in the desired
manner. If a constitution needs to specify the decision-making
structure, it also needs to specify some rules guiding the decisions
themselves.
What follows is that the constitution itself must ultimately define
the people’s purposes.96 Of course, the constitution cannot specify
such purposes on a day-to-day basis. But if the government is to be
constituted as an instrumentality serving the people’s purposes, the
constitution must specify the general criteria by which the people
can know whether the government’s particular, day-to-day decisions
are serving that function. The acknowledged task of any constitu-
tion—which is to establish the structure of the government—would
be impossible without some sense of the people’s real purposes. How
could the framers make choices between alternatives, and how could
they design the structures by which quotidian decisions are made,
without guidance of that sort? One could say that the structure
should allow the people to identify their own purposes at any given
time to the fullest possible extent, but that only restates the same
underlying problem. 
The standard way of responding to these concerns is to conceive
of the constitution as establishing structure and imposing con-
straints.97 That is, the constitution defines the decision-making
95. See ROBERT MICHELS, POLITCAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 36-40, 377-92 (Eden Paul & Cedar Paul
trans., 2d ed. 1978) (arguing that narrow groups always control the government, this being
the “iron law of oligarchy”). For other classic works advancing a similar argument, see JOSEPH
A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 284-89 (1942), and MAX WEBER,
Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 81 (H. H. Gerth & C.
Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946). For other studies finding that narrow, self-perpetuating
elites govern even our own open, democratic society, see generally ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO
GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961); G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, WHO
RULES AMERICA? (1967); C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (2d ed. 2000).
96. For another discussion of this purposive approach to constitutionalism based on the
principle of intentionality rather than instrumentality, see Rubin, supra note 19, at 308.
97. Nearly every leading constitutional law casebook and treatise is organized according
to this idea. That is, the first part of the book (usually somewhat less than half the book’s
total length) is devoted to structural issues—the powers of the federal government, separation
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process and then places constraints on the results this process
reaches. There are, however, two problems with this view. The first
is that it relies on the contract theory of government. This is a
theory that, as stated previously, was developed to provide a sense
of continuity with medieval thought, failed to accurately describe
the process of constitution making, and has been regarded as
irrelevant for about two hundred years.98 Even more seriously,
contract theory does not capture the real significance of consti-
tutionalism, which is to transform government from an autonomous
entity to an instrumentality. The second problem is that neither
structures nor constraints can define the purposes that the constitu-
tion is supposed to serve. Choosing constraints, like choosing struc-
tures, must be guided by some underlying substantive commitment,
some sense of what is essential to the group of people for whom the
constitution is designed.
Thus, a constitution’s basic meaning—that is, establishing gov-
ernment as an instrumentality that serves the people’s purposes
—leads to the conclusion that the constitution must specify those
purposes. It must contain some sort of substantive principles to
guide its design decisions and to provide criteria for the performance
of the government that it designs. For people to remain committed
to a constitution and to be willing to live within its terms is to re-
main committed to those purposes and interests. If the people’s
basic commitments change and if they no longer believe in the
animating principles of their constitution, they will abolish it.
of powers, and federalism—while the second half is devoted to constraints on governmental
action—mainly due process, equal protection, and the First Amendment. See, e.g., ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (3d ed. 2006) (chapter 1, at
1-32, on historical background; chapters 2-5, at 33-474, on structure; chapters 6-12, at 475-
1267, on constraints); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8th ed.
2010) (chapters 1-9, at 1-414, on structure; chapters 10-17, at 415-1674, on constraints);
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (16th ed. 2007) (chapters
1-6, at 1-338, on structure; chapters 7-14, at 339-1370, on constraints); JONATHAN D. VARAT,
WILLIAM COHEN & VIKRAM D. AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (13th ed.
2009) (chapter 1, at 16-23, historical background; chapters 2-7, at 24-502, on structure;
chapters 8-17, at 503-1962, on constraints). Laurence Tribe’s American Constitutional Law
is somewhat different, organized instead by successive historical models; as it turns out,
however, the models follow the same structure-constraint pattern. LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2000). Most law schools organize their constitutional
courses the same way, with a first-year course on structure, and one or two required or widely
taken upper-class courses focusing on constraints.
98. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
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Assuming they remain committed to the idea of constitutionalism,
they will draft a new constitution with different animating princi-
ples.99 Alternatively, they might decide to dispense with a constitu-
tion entirely, perhaps because they believe that the government
should be an autonomous entity rather than an instrumentality. A
final possibility is that the constitution remains in effect, or is
enacted in the first place, because the government has already
become an autonomous entity and finds that the constitution is a
useful device for imposing its will upon the people. That was the
case with the Soviet Union’s constitution;100 however, because it did
not reflect the basic idea that the government is an instrumentality
of the people, no serious observer regarded it as a real constitution.
The purposes that the constitution serves must be conceived in
general terms. Because they guide the particular provisions of the
constitution—the structures and constraints that comprise the con-
stitution’s legal, or operative, text—they must stand above those
textual provisions. Some scholars and jurists have advanced the
claim that a constitution’s text should speak for itself, so that it
can be interpreted without reference to any principles beyond
its operative language.101 Other scholars and jurists claim that the
99. See generally HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN
POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (2000) (describing the constitution design process in Soviet bloc
countries following the collapse of the U.S.S.R.); Kim L. Scheppele, Guardians of the
Constitution: Constitutional Court Presidents and the Struggle for the Rule of Law in Post-
Soviet Europe, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1757 (2006) (describing the operation of new constitutions
after regime change in the former Soviet bloc). In a later article, Scheppele points out that
new constitutions drafted after a regime change often pay a great deal of attention to the past,
with which the framers are, after all, deeply and painfully familiar, and because they look
hesitantly toward an uncertain future. See Kim L. Scheppele, A Constitution Between Past
and Future, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2008). The point here is that the people will
reject the previous constitution if they no longer believe in its purposes, even if they then
reenact some or many of its provisions out of a sense of insecurity. See id. at 1402-05.
100. See ISAAC DEUTCHER, STALIN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 358-59 (2d ed. 1967); MARTIN
MCCAULEY, THE SOVIET UNION: 1917-1991, at 104, 124, 159 (2d ed. 1993).
101. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes ... and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823
(1997); John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional
Texts, 113 YALE  L.J. 1663 (2004); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 37-41 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997); Seth B. Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why
Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly
Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1367-72 (2005); Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young,
Commentary, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L.
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constitution should be interpreted in accordance with its original
meaning, that is, the meaning that the framers or the ratifiers
consciously attached to its provisions when the document was
drafted.102 Legal scholars have widely criticized these theories,
generally known as textualism and originalism.103 The difficulty
with both of them, in terms of this discussion, is that they rely on
contract theory. The argument for originalism is that it represents
the original agreement, the basis on which people relinquished their
natural liberty. Textualism rests on essentially the same argument,
because it recommends a mode of interpretation that is completely
inconsistent with contemporary thought about how a text should be,
and indeed can only be, interpreted;104 the sole reason to advance
REV. 730 (2000). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 621 (1990).
102. See, e.g., GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 23-26, 51-56
(1992); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
167-70 (1990); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS 42-47
(1994); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 163, 182-87 (1999); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism
for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620-29 (1999); Lino A. Graglia, Essay, “Interpreting”
the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1044 (1992); Richard S. Kay,
Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and
Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 260-63 (1988); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 949-53 (1995); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861-62 (1989); John Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by
Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 296-301
(1996). See generally Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1086-87, 1093 (1989).
103. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 44-50 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 788
(1999); Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143
(1998); Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875,
899-901, 950 (2003); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: Rethinking the
Constitutional Relation Between Principle and Prudence, 43 DUKE L.J. 1, 36-37 (1993);
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Vicki
C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1281-83 (2001).
104. See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, S/Z 5-13 (Richard Miller trans., Hill & Wang 1974);
UMBERTO ECO, THE ROLE OF THE READER: EXPLORATIONS IN THE SEMIOTICS OF TEXTS 3-5, 39-
40 (1979); STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES 1-3, 16-17 (1980); HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 154-56 (Garrett
Barden & John Cumming eds., The Seabury Press 1975); ROMAN INGARDEN, THE LITERARY
WORK OF ART: AN INVESTIGATION ON THE BORDERLINES OF ONTOLOGY, LOGIC, AND THEORY OF
LITERATURE 16-19 (George G. Grabowicz trans., 1973); WOLFGANG ISER, THE ACT OF READING:
A THEORY OF AESTHETIC RESPONSE 15-19 (1978); ROMAN JAKOBSON, ON LANGUAGE 56-60
(Linda R. Waugh & Monique Monville-Burston eds., 1990); JULIA KRISTEVA, REVOLUTION IN
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this concept is that the text represents that same original agree-
ment. But, as stated earlier, that is not the right way to regard a
constitution.105 The meaning of a constitution is to establish the
government as an instrumentality of the people: not only the people
at the time the constitution was drafted, but the people who live
under the constitution after the original generation is dead.
Considering how purposes function over time enables us to see
the way that they give meaning to constitutional provisions. To have
a purpose represents a commitment, a direction, whose application
to particular situations is determined as those situations arise. That
process proceeds over time, as situations present themselves and as
the actors reflect on the meaning of the purposes through continued
efforts to apply them.106 In other words, the meaning of a constitu-
tion’s purposes cannot be fully known at the time that the constitu-
tion is enacted.107 It is through the historical experience of acting on
the basis of these principles that people learn the contours of their
commitments.
The process occurs at two different levels, which can be described
as pragmatic and conceptual. At the pragmatic level, the situation
that arises confronts the actors with unexpected or undesired
consequences. Facing those difficulties, they become aware that they
did not fully realize what the purpose would require and must now,
if they are to remain true to the purpose, accept consequences that
they hoped, or assumed, they could avoid. To use a nonpolitical ex-
ample, suppose a high school student decides that he wants to get
into a good college. To do so, he realizes that he needs to improve his
grades. What he may have in mind when he commits himself to this
purpose is that he will take his work more seriously when he is
doing it and concentrate more intensely. When the next semester
starts, however, he may realize that he has already been concentrat-
ing about as much as is possible for him and that improving his
grades will require him to spend more time studying and less time
going out at night. He cannot really say he is surprised by this
realization; certainly, he was aware when he adopted his purpose
that spending more time studying was one way to improve his
POETIC LANGUAGE 100-01 (Margaret Waller trans., Columbia Univ. Press abr. trans. 1984).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
106. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 309-14.
107. Id. at 309.
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grades and get into a better college. What the situation revealed to
him was that he would need to accept this pragmatic consequence
he was hoping to avoid in order to remain true to his purpose. 
At the conceptual level, the situation confronts the actors with
new and unexpected meanings of their purposes. As a result,
aspects of each purpose are revealed to the actors that they simply
did not conceive of previously. The purpose’s scope expands, and the
actor perceives that an expanded range of situations is now encom-
passed within it. Consider another student who adopts the same
purpose of getting into a good college and is told by her guidance
counselor that colleges are now looking for students who have dem-
onstrated leadership in addition to good grades. This comes as a
surprise: she had thought that starting a literary club or being
captain of her tennis team was a way to be popular, or to get some
extra privileges like a sticker for a better parking lot at school,
neither of which was a particular concern of hers. Now she realizes
that these activities, which she had previously thought irrelevant or
distracting, were in fact encompassed by her purpose. 
Treating the constitution as a purposive document—one that
conceives of government as an instrumentality for serving the pur-
poses of the people—provides a resolution to the debate between
originalist and evolutionary theories by clarifying each position.
Originalists tend to elide the important distinction between what
was in a person’s mind and what that person intended.108 To return
to our two high school students, suppose each of their mothers says:
“I want you to try hard to get into a good college,” and each has
specifically in mind, when saying this, the image of her child taking
his or her work more seriously and concentrating more intensely.
Perhaps they even specify that strategy out loud. Does that mean
that the first child’s mother did not intend for him to spend more
time studying when he finds out that he needs to, or that the second
child’s mother did not intend for her to become captain of the tennis
team?109 Originalism, in any serious sense that is free of historical
108. See sources cited supra note 102.
109. The presence of the students’ mothers in the example addresses a conceptual defect
in one of the most important and intriguing modern theories of constitutionalism, Jon Elster’s
analysis of self-binding action. In his original study, Elster used the example of Ulysses and
the Sirens to analyze situations in which a rational actor precommits to a particular course
of action because she is concerned that she will make an unwise decision when confronted
1662 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1639
fetishism, means to hold true to the purposes of the original
speakers, not to take their particular means of expression in a lit-
eral manner.110 This is true for the ratifiers of the constitution as
well as for the drafters.111 Some, and perhaps the majority, of the
ratifying voters may have been unsophisticated, and unable to
distinguish between first- and second-order intentions, but why
should people in the contemporary world feel themselves beholden
with the actual circumstances for which that course of action must be chosen. JON ELSTER,
ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36-37 (1979). An
obvious example is a person’s effort to end addiction to a substance, which Elster discussed
in his follow-up study. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 63-77 (2000). In that study, he uses his self-binding
theory to determine the meaning of a constitution. Id. at 88-174. Laurence Tribe endorses this
same rationale in his treatise on constitutional law. TRIBE, supra note 97, at 22-23. It is a
formidable theory, but the problem with it is that a constitutional regime is not an example
of self-binding. The framers of a constitution are not binding themselves in their capacity as
framers; indeed they pass out of existence in that capacity once the constitution is ratified.
Rather, they are binding different people, those people who will govern in the future. 
The public officials who hold power under the constitutional regime are not binding
themselves either. As a conceptual matter, these officials are subject to the constitution,
which is, of course, external to them. As a practical matter, these officials are subject to the
courts, which typically enforce the constitution’s provisions. Proposals to abolish judicial
review or to end judicial supremacy would make Elster’s argument more relevant. See, e.g.,
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 247-48 (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
6-32 (1999); Jeremy Waldron, Essay, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE
L.J. 1346, 1353, 1406 (1999). But in our current constitutional regime, the instructions that
the students are interpreting must be treated as coming from their mothers, not from their
own previous decisions.
110. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519,
548-49 (2003).
111. The concept is thus equally applicable to what Keith Whittington has called the New
Originalism. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 599,
609 (2004) (“[T]he new originalism is focused less on the concrete intentions of individual
drafters of constitutional text than on the public meaning of the text that was adopted.”); see
also Nelson, supra note 110, at 547-49. The asserted advantage of New Originalism is that
it moves from private to public meaning and that it replaces the somewhat foolish-looking
search through Madison’s and Wilson’s private correspondence to an inquiry into prevailing
attitudes. See Whittington, supra, at 609-10. But apart from the fact that those prevailing
attitudes may be as difficult for us to discern and understand as the views of individuals, this
approach does not solve the problem that the ratifiers, like the Framers, are dead, and we
have to decide why we should follow them. In fact, this shift exacerbates the problem by
removing the element of admiration that we can feel toward people like Madison and Wilson.
In addition, New Originalism still fails to tell us whether the relevant people—ratifiers or
framers—intended the future to be bound by their present understandings or whether they
understood the need for pragmatic and conceptual adaptation.
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to the views of this lowest common denominator? The only rationale
for doing so is the long-outmoded contract theory of government.112
An evolutionary approach to the constitution captures the
dynamic way that the interpretation of particular constitutional
provisions responds to changing situations.113 The difficulty with
such an approach is that it lacks criteria for judgment. If the only
stated criterion is the current government’s decisions, then the
principle of constitutionalism is largely abandoned; if the only
actual criterion is the preferences of the officials, presumably
judges, charged with the enforcement of the constitution, then the
principle is largely debased.114 Taking the constitution’s purposes
into account provides guidance to those officials about the way they
should respond to changing circumstances. In particular, it indicates
that these officials should require the other members of govern-
ment—the elected representatives, in most cases—to accept the
pragmatic consequences and the conceptual expansion of the consti-
tution’s purposes.115 This is not a formula that will yield definitive
answers in complex situations, of course, but it provides a coherent
112. See Wilson R. Huhn, Constantly Approximating Popular Sovereignty: Seven
Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 291, 314-15
(2010).
113. See, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
THE BASIC QUESTIONS 70-76 (2007); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 215-28 (1995);
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 229-
31 (1980); Rebecca L. Brown, Essay, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 180-81 (1993);
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 10-15 (1979); Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 412-15 (1997);
Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1041-42 (1977); Nelson, supra note 110, at 543-47; Jed Rubenfeld,
The Moment and the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085, 1100-01 & nn.69-70 (1998);
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 885-88
(1996). 
114. Judicial review is not necessarily essential to the principle of constitutionalism. As I
have argued elsewhere, some entity outside of those who control the government’s monopoly
of legitimate force must be able to enforce the constitution in order for it to be effective, but
that could be an ombudsperson or a separately elected council. Rubin, supra note 66, at 92-96.
In modern constitutions, however, this entity is almost invariably the judiciary, and this
Article assumes that mechanism for the sake of simplicity.
115. Cf. Stephen M. Feldman, Do Supreme Court Nominees Lie? The Politics of
Adjudication, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 17, 23 (2008) (discussing politics according to a
mutual sense of purpose and reviewing the notion that “adjudication and jurisprudence are
interpretive practices” by which the interpreter imposes historic principles on the legal
practice).
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framework of discourse within which consideration of the constitu-
tion’s meaning can occur.
The purposive approach to the constitution changes the relation-
ship between the courts and the other branches of government. In
particular, it changes the constitutional significance of statutes
enacted by elected representatives. According to the prevailing view,
these statutes either fall within permissible boundaries established
by the constitution, as constitutional courts interpret it, or exceed
those boundaries, in which case the courts will strike them down.116
In other words, the relationship between the courts and the other
parts of government is one of wary separation. Elected representa-
tives, like wild beasts, are ignored if they remain on the reserve and
struck down if they stray outside it. If the constitution is viewed as
embodying substantive purposes, however, and those purposes are
recognized as revealing their consequences and extent over time in
response to new circumstances, then statutes and other actions by
elected representatives, such as executive proclamations, can be
relevant to that revelatory process. Clearly, these representatives
are motivated by the same basic purposes. The courts may be the
guardians of those purposes, but the purposes themselves pervade
the entire government and, indeed, the entire society. If these
purposes were not pervasive, then the society would no longer be
willing to consider itself bound by the constitution.
In other words, courts should regard the other parts of govern-
ment as potentially having something useful or informative to say
about the meaning of the purposes that guide constitutional inter-
pretation. This does not mean that the courts should relinquish
their role as the final arbiters of constitutional meaning. That
position, generally known as departmentalism, is championed by a
number of commentators.117 But as I have argued elsewhere,
116. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (“[I]t is for the legislature,
not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the [statute]. The day is gone
when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down
state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”).
117. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27-53 (1988); David Barron,
Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Non-Enforcement Power, 63 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 61-63 (2000); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and
Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 83 (1998); Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-
Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8-9
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departmentalism undermines judicial review—the only mechanism
that has ever been developed for overturning the decisions of the
society’s prevailing power-holders without resort to violence.118 The
preferable approach is that the courts, without abandoning their
authoritative role, should be attentive to the way that the public
officials who govern the society implement the purposes they share
with constitutional courts. It is the daily task of these officials to
adapt those purposes to circumstances at the pragmatic level, and
it is the intermittent—but not infrequent—task of these officials to
expand the application of those purposes at the conceptual level.
The way officials do so can guide courts in their own efforts to in-
terpret the constitution in accordance with its underlying purposes.
Of course, not all statutes or other governmental actions are
relevant to the interpretive process in this way. Some statutes are
irrelevant, because they deal with matters unrelated to the constitu-
tion’s purposes. Others will in fact violate those purposes and be
struck down: if the courts never found any statute in violation of the
constitution, judicial review would be an illusion or a charade. The
statutes that courts should regard as informative and instructive
are, of course, those that advance the constitution’s purposes.119
Whether a particular statute does so is for the courts, as guardians
of the constitution, to decide. But the fact that courts have final
interpretive authority does not prevent them from maintaining a
collaborative relationship with the legislature.120 Contrary to con-
tract theory, the actions of elected officials can influence constitu-
tional interpretation, not by displacing the role of the courts, but by
informing the courts about possible ways that the constitution’s
underlying purposes can be applied and expanded in light of the
(2000); Neal Kumar Katyal, Essay, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J.
1335, 1335 (2001); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of
Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1268-70 (1996); Thomas W. Merrill,
Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
43, 43 (1993); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Essay, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 443-45 (2000);
Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and
Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 773 (2002).
118. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 301.
119. See id. at 304.
120. See id. at 308-09.
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ever-changing circumstances that every modern government must
confront.
C. The Purposes of the U.S. Constitution
In order to interpret the U.S. Constitution according to the
framework presented in the previous Section, it is of course
necessary to identify the Constitution’s animating purposes. This is
a historical question, but the historical inquiry involved is not the
sort that is typically found in originalist literature. For the reasons
stated above, the question is not what the Framers envisioned when
they drafted specific provisions.121 To begin with, it is difficult to
know exactly what they thought, and impossible to know whether
they would have wanted their thoughts to control subsequent in-
terpretations.122 It is even harder to know what the ratifying public
thought about any specific constitutional provision.123 More im-
portantly, these considerations are irrelevant. Even if we had
perfect knowledge of what the Framers or ratifiers thought, we
could not possibly know how they would have adjusted those notions
in response to circumstances they did not consider or could not have
imagined. 
The relevant inquiry instead involves the general principles to
which the Framers—and perhaps the ratifiers—were committed,
the purposes of the Constitution as a whole. These purposes, unlike
specific provisions, are inherently dynamic; they reveal their
meaning over time through the pragmatic and conceptual processes
that have been described in the previous Section.124 In addition, due
to their generality, they possess an emotive contour that makes
them relevant to subsequent generations.125 The general public, and
even most public officials, cannot really care about the Framers’
thoughts regarding particular constitutional provisions. What
they can care about, however, are the overarching purposes that
121. See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
122. According to Professor Jefferson Powell, the likelihood is that they did not. See H.
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 885
(1985).
123. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 11-20 (1996).
124. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 309; supra Part I.B.
125. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 321. 
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animated the Constitution as a whole. That sense of caring, that
commitment, makes people willing to continue and sustain the
structure established by the Constitution and accept judicial review
of their representatives’ decisions.
It is not difficult to identify the purposes that motivated the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution and the citizens who ratified it.
The three most notable purposes are (1) strong national govern-
ment, (2) liberty, and (3) equality. These themes are sounded in the
Preamble to the Constitution—the only part of the document that
states its general principles—the first two explicitly, the third
strongly implied by the reference to justice.126 Similarly, the quoted
language of the Declaration,127 which states the premises behind the
American Revolution and which the Framers certainly had in
mind,128 proclaims liberty and equality to be explicit purposes of the
Revolution. In addition, it at least implies the need for a strong
national government, as government is not only expected to ensure
life and liberty, but also the pursuit of happiness.129 To be sure,
these purposes do not control the entire Constitution, which also
includes many technical provisions, rules of the road, and arbitrary
choices contained within its text. Some of these clauses represent
political compromises, some the brute necessity of setting up a
government, and some mere numerology—for instance the mini-
mum ages for the President, senators and representatives, which
are all divisible by five.130 But consideration of the Constitution’s
three central underlying purposes mentioned above illuminates
many of the most crucial and controversial provisions, especially
those that reviewing courts have used to strike down legislative and
executive decisions.
The historical record clearly indicates the importance of these
themes. The Constitutional Convention was called for the explicit
purpose of creating a strong national government to replace the ob-
viously ineffective Articles of Confederation.131 Liberty, as Bernard
126. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 62, 64 and accompanying text.
128. See RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 61 (2009).
129. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
130. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. 1, § 3, cl. 3; id. art. 2, § 1, cl. 4.
131. See BEEMAN, supra note 128, at 167-69; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 471-83 (1969). Specific problems that had arisen during
1668 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1639
Bailyn has observed, meant much more to the Revolutionary gen-
eration than freedom from British imperialism; it was a genuine
ideology, an abiding commitment that shaped the Framers’ atti-
tudes toward all questions of governance.132 Liberty was so well
recognized by the general populace that it could serve as a rallying
cry,133 an organizational title,134 and, in the speech that made
Patrick Henry famous, a condition more valuable than life itself.135
Equality was a similarly central idea to the Framers, as Gordon
Wood has argued.136 Its importance to the Revolutionary generation
can only be understood by recalling the extent to which hierarchy
dominated eighteenth-century society and to which patronage and
privilege dominated eighteenth-century government.137 Writing in
the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville concluded that Americans, like
other democratic peoples, “show a more ardent and more lasting
love for equality than for freedom.”138
the Confederation Period included breaches of civil order, WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY
AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 145-61 (2007); LEONARD L. RICHARDS,
SHAYS’S REBELLION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION’S FINAL BATTLE 4-42 (2002); DAVID D.
SZATMARY, SHAYS’ REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION 37-69, 114-19
(1980); economic dislocation, Richard D. Brown, Shays’s Rebellion and the Ratification of the
Federal Constitution in Massachusetts, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 113, 113-27 (Richard Beeman, Stephen
Botein & Edward C. Carter II eds., 1987); BEEMAN, supra note 128, at 9; HOLTON, supra at
179-98, 213-23; Janet Riesman, Money, Credit, and Federalist Political Economy, in BEYOND
CONFEDERATION, supra, at 28-61; and the threat of foreign intervention, RAKOVE, supra note
123, at 26-28.
132. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 55-93
(rev. ed. 1992).
133. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 772 n.54 (1994) (describing liberty as part of “a rallying cry for all those who hated
government oppression” in the colonies).
134. The Sons of Liberty were a group of secret societies formed to foment the Revolution.
See BENJAMIN L. CARP, DEFIANCE OF THE PATRIOTS: THE BOSTON TEA PARTY AND THE MAKING
OF AMERICA 37, 161-81 (2010).
135. See HARLOW GILES UNGER, LION OF LIBERTY: PATRICK HENRY AND THE CALL TO A NEW
NATION 96-99, 279-82 (2010).
136. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 232 (1991)
(“Equality was in fact the most radical and most powerful ideological force let loose in the
Revolution. Its appeal was far more potent than any of the revolutionaries realized. Once
invoked, the idea of equality could not be stopped, and it tore through American society and
culture with awesome power.”).
137. See generally id. at 11-92.
138. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 479 (Harvey Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835).
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider whether there
were other principles guiding the formation and ratification of the
Constitution that were as significant as these. An obvious candidate
is democracy, but this involves complexities that the term’s sub-
sequent success tends to obscure. At the time the Constitution was
being drafted, the term “democracy” still carried the negative con-
notations of mob rule that led Aristotle to characterize it as one of
the perverted forms of government.139 Many people still regarded
democracy as a negative consequence of freedom and equality,
rather than as the embodiment of these values.140 The various
nondemocratic features of the constitutional design that Sanford
Levinson has noted reflect this ambivalence.141 Of course, the term
quickly began to acquire the positive associations that prevail to
this day,142 but as I have argued elsewhere,143 this has occurred, at
least in part, because it was associated with representative gov-
ernment, which was, and remains, a different concept.144 
139. ARISTOTLE, supra note 81, at 187-91. On the eighteenth-century attitude toward
democracy, see JENNIFER TOLBERT ROBERTS, ATHENS ON TRIAL 175-93 (1994); WOOD, supra
note 131, at 197-98.
140. See, e.g., BAILYN, supra note 132, at 280-301. Bailyn notes that “‘democracy’—a word
that denoted the lowest order of society as well as the form of government in which the
commons ruled—was generally associated with the threat of civil disorder and the early
assumption of power by a dictator.” Id. at 282. 
141. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 6-7 (2006). Among the features
Levinson discusses are the Electoral College, state representation in the Senate, and life
tenure for Supreme Court Justices. Id. The original Constitution also provided for the election
of Senators by the state legislators, a system ended by the Seventeenth Amendment. Id. at
49.
142. See generally DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 138; 1 GEORGE GROTE, A HISTORY OF
GREECE; FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION CONTEMPORARY WITH
ALEXANDER THE GREAT (2d ed. 1907) (presenting Athens, and thus democratic government,
in a favorable light, as opposed to previous histories that favored Sparta).
143. Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy,149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 717-20 (2001).
144. Other possible candidates for animating principles, like property or capitalism, see
generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (3d ed. 1941), raise additional complexities. For this Article’s argument,
consideration of strong national government, liberty, and equality as the dominant purposes
is sufficient. 
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1. Strong National Government
The way that these values operate as constitutional purposes, as
described in the preceding Section,145 can be illustrated by briefly
considering each in turn. When the Framers decided to create a
strong national government that featured a chief executive, that
acted by majority votes rather than by unanimity, and that pos-
sessed compulsory power over the states in a wide variety of areas,
they may or may not have considered the possibility that the federal
government might establish a national bank, or that a state might
try to tax it. They certainly did not draft any language that explic-
itly addressed either issue. 
In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall upheld the
constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States and struck
down a tax that Maryland was trying to impose on it, memorably
declaring that the “power to tax involves the power to destroy.”146
The decision represents a fairly mild way in which purposes develop
over time in response to circumstances. Marshall enthusiastically
supported the purpose of strong national government.147 Presented
with a new national institution that the Framers had not specifi-
cally envisioned, he implemented that purpose by interpreting the
powers of the national legislature, in particular the Necessary and
Proper Clause, as encompassing that institution.148 Presented with
an unexpected threat to those powers in the form of a state tax, he
implemented that same purpose by fashioning a new limit on state
authority.149 Both of Marshall’s decisions in McCulloch are more
plausibly viewed as an adaptation of the purpose of strong national
government to a novel, if not entirely unexpected, situation, than as
an interpretation of either the Constitution’s language or the actual
intent of its Framers.
Another, more dramatic adaptation of that principle came a short
time later during the Nullification Crisis. In response to South
145. See supra Part I.B. 
146. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). 
147. See JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL,
AND THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES 140 (2002); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN
MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 444-45 (1996).
148. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 418-22.
149. Id. at 436.
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Carolina’s Ordinance of Nullification,150 which declared the federal
tariffs of 1828 and 1832 unconstitutional,151 President Jackson
issued his “Proclamation to the People of South Carolina,” asserting
the constitutionality of the tariffs and the illegality of South
Carolina’s action.152 To assert that a state could nullify federal law,
he wrote, is “incompatible with the existence of the Union, contra-
dicted expressly by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by
its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was founded,
and destructive of the great object for which it was formed.”153
Jackson’s statements are an interpretation of the Constitution. They
rest on the explicit language of the Supremacy Clause,154 but they
interpret that Clause in response to circumstances, guided by the
constitutional purpose of strong national government. They il-
lustrate the role of nonjudicial actors—here, the President—in
interpreting the document, an interpretation reiterated by the Court
when the State of Arkansas attempted to, in effect, nullify the
Court’s earlier decision in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I).155
To be sure, the Proclamation was an executive action, not a statute
enacted by Congress, but the President is also an elected represen-
tative, and a purposive approach suggests that his actions may be
equally relevant in revealing the meaning of the Constitution. In
any case, Congress effectively codified Jackson’s Proclamation in the
150. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 402-04 (2007); GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN, THE JACKSONIAN ERA, 1828-
1848, at 72-73 (1959); SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO
LINCOLN 378-79 (2005). The Ordinance of Nullification was enacted by a special convention
established by the South Carolina legislature.
151. HOWE, supra note 150, at 404.
152. H.W. BRANDS, ANDREW JACKSON: HIS LIFE AND TIMES 478-79 (2005); HOWE, supra note
150, at 405; VAN DEUSEN, supra note 150, at 74-75; WILENTZ, supra note 150, at 380-83.
153. VAN DEUSEN, supra note 150, at 74. Jackson went on to argue that the federal
government represents the people, not the states, and thus a state that secedes “does not
break a league, but destroys the unity of the nation.” Id.
154. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
155. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958). Cooper spoke in terms of obedience to the
judiciary and judicial supremacy because the legal rule that the opinion reasserted was the
one articulated previously by the Supreme Court in Brown I that “in the field of public
education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.” 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). But the
reasoning in Cooper is equally applicable to a statute, and although the Court only cited
judicial decisions, Jackson’s language in his Proclamation reverberates in the Court’s
unanimous decision: “No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the
Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.... A Governor who asserts a
power to nullify a federal court order is similarly restrained.” Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18-19.
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Force Bill, which it passed the following year.156 The Proclamation
also illustrates the way that purposes guide the adaptation of the
foundational document to circumstances at the pragmatic level: it
not only removed any residual uncertainty about the effect of
federal law but also established the federal government’s right to
use force to ensure compliance.157
The same year that he issued the Proclamation, Jackson vetoed
the bill rechartering the Second Bank of the United States.158
Although he undoubtedly had a variety of political motivations, his
stated rationale, like his rationale for issuing the Proclamation, was
based on his interpretation of the Constitution.159 The Bank’s
creation, he wrote, despite Marshall’s decision in McCulloch, was
beyond the power of the federal government.160 Although no court
has ever questioned his authority to veto the bill, his rationale for
doing so has not survived: instrumentalities such as the Bank are
now regularly created by the federal government and recognized as
well within its powers.161 The reason is not that Jackson’s under-
standing of the Constitution’s language or the Framers’ intentions
was obviously wrong. It is because his use of the veto, unlike the
Proclamation, was a constitutional interpretation in direct conflict
with one of the Constitution’s underlying purposes— the creation of
a strong national government. Interestingly, Jackson, perhaps
aware of this issue in light of the Nullification Crisis, attempted to
support his argument by invoking the purpose of equality: the Bank,
he argued, was an instrument of privilege.162 Although that was
156. See WILENTZ, supra note 150, at 385-86.
157. See BRANDS, supra note 152, at 476-78.
158. Timothy A. Canova, Black Swans and Black Elephants in Plain Sight: An Empirical
Review of Central Bank Independence, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 237, 310 (2011).
159. BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CIVIL WAR 405-10 (1957); HOWE, supra note 150, at 379-80; VAN DEUSEN, supra note 150, at
66; WILENTZ, supra note 150, at 369-70.
160. See VAN DEUSEN, supra note 150, at 66.
161. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (2006)) (establishing the Federal Reserve System).
162. HOWE, supra note 150, at 380 (“[W]hen the laws undertake to ... grant titles,
gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the
humble members of society—the farmers, mechanics, and laborers—who have neither the
time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the
injustice of their Government.” (quoting Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in
2 A COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 576, 590
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897))); see also WILENTZ, supra note 150, at 370. 
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probably correct, the constitutional purpose of equality has not been
regarded as preventing the federal government from conferring
economic advantages on some groups as opposed to others.
The application of the Constitution’s purposes at the conceptual
level to subsequent events that the Framers probably could not have
imagined is further illustrated by the controversy over federal
regulatory legislation. Medieval and early modern government
generally left social welfare to private parties and religious insti-
tutions.163 It was only in response to the industrialization and
urbanization of the nineteenth century that European governments
began to enact legislation related to social welfare.164 The United
States, for a variety of reasons, responded somewhat more slowly,
and that response, because of the American adherence to federal-
ism, came mainly from state governments in the period before the
Civil War.165 Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, in
the so-called Progressive Era, the federal government became much
more interventionist, enacting a wide range of social welfare legis-
lation.166 The Supreme Court reacted by striking down or restricting
a number of major federal enactments on Commerce Clause or
Tenth Amendment grounds.167 The Court’s interpretation of these
163. For the scope of government in the late medieval and early modern periods, see
generally COLLINS, supra note 46; ERTMAN, supra note 41; DENYS HAY, EUROPE IN THE
FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES (1966).
164. See, e.g., BARKER, supra note 42, at 73-74; HENRY JACOBY, THE BUREAUCRATIZATION
OF THE WORLD 56-57 (Eveline L. Kanes trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1973).
165. See BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL
AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 299 (2009); see also SUSAN M. STERETT, PUBLIC
PENSIONS: GENDER AND CIVIC SERVICE IN THE STATES, 1850-1937, at 4 (2003) (describing the
states’ central role in distributing pensions due to the lack of “national social welfare
payments” pre-New Deal).
166. See JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS II, THE TYRANNY OF CHANGE: AMERICA IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890-1920, at 132-200 (2d ed. 2000); LEWIS L. GOULD, AMERICA IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890-1914, at 38-67 (2001). See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING
A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920
(1982).
167. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1936) (striking down the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act as beyond the limits of the Commerce Clause); United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 77-78 (1936) (striking down the Agricultural Adjustment Act on
Tenth Amendment grounds); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273-74 (1918) (striking
down the prohibition on goods produced by child labor on Tenth Amendment grounds); Ill.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U.S. 514, 527 (1906) (striking down quarantine requirement
for diseased animals as beyond the limits of the Commerce Clause); United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 14 (1895) (precluding the Sherman Antitrust Act from being applied
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provisions, like its closely associated doctrine of substantive due
process,168 was repudiated by the Court when Franklin Roosevelt’s
appointees took control in the late 1930s.169 
Although it seems safe to assume that the Framers did not
envision a regulatory state, that is not the relevant consideration.
Changing circumstances have not only presented us with new prob-
lems but have essentially generated a new conception of govern-
ment. A regulatory state is structured differently from its predeces-
sor, enacts different kinds of legislation, and functions in different
ways.170 The relevant question is whether such a state comports
with the underlying purpose of strong national government, and
whether that purpose needs to be expanded, at the conceptual level,
to encompass this previously unanticipated transformation. Clearly,
it does: no modern state can dispense with regulatory legislation
and function effectively. The reason that the early twentieth-
century Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment decisions were
repudiated was not because the Progressive Era Court misinter-
preted the Framers’ intentions or the actual constitutional text, but
because it misunderstood the Framers’ purposes. The recent revival
of the Commerce Clause171 only nibbles slightly at the edges of the
to manufacturing on Commerce Clause grounds).
168. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 200-04 (1995).
169. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (holding that a farmer who
grew wheat for his own consumption was engaged in interstate commerce); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113-17 (1941) (concluding that regulation of labor conditions was within
the scope of the Commerce Clause, overruling the rule laid down in Hammer); NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 35-39 (1937) (determining that production is part of
interstate commerce and thus that the processes related to it were within the scope of
Commerce Clause regulation). 
170. For an elaboration of this argument, see generally EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND
CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE (2005).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (invalidating the
Violence Against Women Act as outside the scope of the Commerce Clause); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 933-35 (1997) (invalidating on Tenth Amendment grounds the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act’s provision that state law enforcement officials perform
background checks on gun purchasers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995)
(holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress’s authority under the
Commerce Clause); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (invalidating on
Tenth Amendment grounds the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act’s
requirement that states take title to certain radioactive waste). The law the Court struck
down in Lopez under the Commerce Clause occupied the outer limits of Commerce Clause
authority and had features that distinguished it from the bulk of federal legislation. See
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regulatory state; nonetheless, these decisions are vulnerable to
criticism on this basis.172
2. Liberty
The second purpose, that of securing liberty, clearly encompasses
the freedom of speech. If there was any doubt concerning this when
the Constitution was drafted, the adoption of the First Amendment
removed it immediately.173 There is equally little doubt that those
who voted for this Amendment understood that it referred to
political speech.174 Although other types of speech, such as commer-
cial speech, artistic speech, or nonverbal speech, may raise difficult
questions about the First Amendment’s coverage, political speech
clearly lies at the Amendment’s core.175 But the pragmatic difficul-
ties that both courts and elected officials have experienced in re-
maining true to that purpose have proven to be formidable. As
Geoffrey Stone recounts in Perilous Times, elected officials have
regularly enacted statutes punishing popular dissent during periods
of war, and the courts have regularly upheld these statutes and
convicted those indicted under them.176
Stone identifies six sets of legal initiatives that fit this pattern:
the Alien and Sedition Acts adopted during the first Adams admin-
istration’s undeclared war with France;177 the military arrests and
Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 694 (1995). Moreover, the Tenth
Amendment decisions have not been followed or have been avoided in subsequent cases. See,
e.g., Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 148 n.10 (2003). Printz does not preclude federal
agents from enforcing the Brady Act, 521 U.S. at 933; New York does not preclude the federal
government from taking control of radioactive waste, 505 U.S. at 188.
172. For my argument that they are incoherent, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD
RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 136-37, 141 (2008).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech.”).
174. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 627, 632 (1990).
175. See id. at 632-34.
176. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION
ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 12-13 (2004).
177. Id. at 16-17. In this case, the judiciary, which was overwhelmingly Federalist,
enthusiastically supported the legislation. Id. at 68. The question was not whether the courts
would strike down the Alien and Sedition Acts, but whether those accused under the Acts
could avoid being tried by those courts. See generally id. at 48-66 (providing examples of
prosecutions under the Sedition Act and corresponding judicial actions).
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newspaper closures during the Civil War;178 the Espionage and
Criminal Syndicalism Acts passed during the First World War;179
the Smith Act, the anti-Fascist trials, and the internment of
Japanese-American citizens during World War II;180 the
McCarthyite hearings and prosecutions during the early years of the
Cold War;181 and the various repressive measures adopted during
the Vietnam War.182 In the first five of these situations—that is,
during the first 179 years of our nation’s history—the Supreme
Court made virtually no effort to control the bellicose frenzy that
gripped the nation during times of conflict. The Court did overturn
one of the McCarthy-era convictions in Yates v. United States, but
it waited until a month and a half after Senator McCarthy was dead
to do so.183 It was not until its 1969 decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio
that the Court definitively declared that political advocacy during
times of war was protected by the First Amendment and could not
be criminalized unless it threatened imminent harm.184 Even then,
the defendant whose conviction the case overturned was not a
178. Id. at 96, 98, 107-08.
179. Id. at 146-47, 224. Adjudicating a free speech case for the first time, a unanimous
Supreme Court declared that Eugene Debs, a labor leader and Socialist candidate for
President—who garnered nearly one million votes in 1912—could be lawfully imprisoned for
ten years for saying that three other Socialists imprisoned under the Espionage Act were
“paying the penalty for standing erect and for seeking to pave the way to better conditions for
all mankind.” Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 213, 216-17 (1919); see STONE, supra note
176, at 196-98.
180. STONE, supra note 176, at 251, 272-73. Most notoriously, the Court sustained the
internment of Japanese Americans. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-19
(1944). Although not a free speech case, it certainly involved a massive curtailment of the
same underlying value, viz. liberty. Several years earlier, the Seventh Circuit upheld a
fifteen-year prison sentence imposed on William Pelley, an outspoken anti-Semite and Nazi
sympathizer, for saying that the Roosevelt administration could have prevented the Pearl
Harbor attack and that the nation was not united in favor of the war. United States v. Pelley,
132 F.2d 170, 177 (7th Cir. 1942); see STONE, supra note 176, at 264-66.
181. STONE, supra note 176, at 313-14. Presented with an opportunity to dampen the anti-
Communist frenzy of the era, the Court instead upheld the convictions of twelve members of
the Communist Party’s national board under the Smith Act, essentially on the ground that
the defendants subscribed to the general tenets of Communism and advocated for the
overthrow of the U.S. government. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951); see
STONE, supra note 176, at 396-410.
182. STONE, supra note 176, at 479-500.
183. 354 U.S. 298, 303 (1957). McCarthy died on May 2, and the Court handed down the
case on June 17. Moreover, the Court subsequently upheld a Smith Act conviction in 1961. See
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 206 (1961).
184. 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (striking down Ohio’s criminal syndicalism law).
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Vietnam War protestor, but a member of the Ku Klux Klan185
—hardly a group that was challenging the current war effort.
This lugubrious history shows how formidable the pragmatic dif-
ficulties of remaining committed to one’s purposes can be. Looking
back over the events that Stone has catalogued, few contemporary
observers would have any doubt that most, if not all, of these gov-
ernment actions violated the First Amendment, whether on the
basis of a textualist, originalist, or evolving theory of constitutional
interpretation. But elected representatives adopted those actions
and the judiciary upheld them. It was all very well for the Framers,
in carrying out their purpose of securing liberty, to declare a right
to free speech, but when subsequent political and judicial officials
were confronted with the undesired consequences of that declara-
tion—dissent at times of national crisis—these officials were
unwilling to accept the consequences. No one could really say that
the situations themselves were unexpected: it is unlikely that any
of the Framers would have been surprised if they were told that the
nation they were creating would end up in a war and that some
citizens would oppose that war. But just as our college student, who
realizes that he has to study in the evening rather than going out,
might find even a readily anticipated consequence of his commit-
ment surprisingly hard to follow in reality, American officials found
the consequences of the purpose to which the nation was committed
difficult to tolerate.
A similar and, in fact, even greater time lag in carrying out the
purpose of liberty involves private sexual relations among homosex-
uals.186 The Court did not strike down statutes criminalizing such
relations until 213 years after the Bill of Rights was adopted.187 For
most of this time, however, the impediment was not pragmatic, but
185. Id. at 444.
186. I have used this example previously. For a fuller discussion see Rubin, supra note 19,
at 317-18.
187. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). The Court, when it finally acted,
was eloquent in arguing that the statute infringes on individual liberty. Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy began with a paean to liberty itself, id. at 562, and went on to say
that “[t]he State cannot demean [gays’ and lesbians’] existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime.” Id. at 578. But see Katherine M. Franke,
Commentary, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1407
(2004) (arguing that the Court’s definition of liberty was limited because it was phrased in
terms of private conduct).
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conceptual. Homosexual relations, and sexual relations in general,
were not regarded as an aspect of liberty when the Constitution was
drafted. The Framers were intimately familiar with the Spartan
Constitution,188 which extensively regulated sexual relations be-
tween married couples, but they probably did not expect the gov-
ernment they were creating to adopt such policies,189 and were
probably not thinking about homosexual relations at all.190 
The conceptual shift that redefined homosexual relationships as
an aspect of human liberty did not begin with the judiciary. Rather,
it was the product of changing social attitudes in general and of a
social movement in particular. A social movement is the mobiliza-
tion of people in civil society by policy entrepreneurs or by a col-
lectively developing awareness.191 Examples include the civil rights
movement,192 the environmental movement,193 the antiabortion
movement,194 and, most recently, the Tea Party. These movements
188. JAMES MADISION, ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 372-73
(Isaac Kramnick, ed, 1987); BAILYN, supra note 132, at 23-25.
189. Their knowledge of this subject came primarily from Plutarch: “In order to the good
education of their youth ... [Lycurgus] went so far back as to take into consideration their very
conception and birth, by regulating their marriages.” PLUTARCH, supra note 91, at 55.
Lycurgus established a system in which husbands only had contact with their wives at night,
so that “they sometimes had children by their wives before they ever saw their faces by
daylight.” Id. at 57. And he “allowed a man who was advanced in years and had a young wife
to recommend some virtuous and approved young man, that she might have a child by him.”
Id. at 58. To read accounts like this and nonetheless express admiration for the Spartan
Constitution, as the Framers did, see WOOD, supra note 136, at 64-65, 232, 423, indicates that
they simply were not thinking of politics as relevant to marital and sexual matters. 
190. The Court took note of this in Lawrence. See 539 U.S. at 568-69. The Declaration does
not complain of any prohibition against homosexual conduct in its list of grievances against
King George. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
191. See supra note 15.
192. See generally DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
(1991); DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY,
1930-1970 (1982); ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK
COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984).
193. See generally ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (2005); POWER, JUSTICE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (David N. Pellow & Robert
J. Brulle eds., 2005).
194. See generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984);
ZIAD W. MUNSON, THE MAKING OF PRO-LIFE ACTIVISTS: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION
WORKS (2008); JAMES RISEN & JUDY L. THOMAS, WRATH OF ANGELS: THE AMERICAN ABORTION
WAR (1998); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
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have shaped American politics in dramatic and decisive ways. The
gay rights movement,195 together with a generalized transformation
of moral attitudes, began to change the legal landscape in the
United States during the 1960s. In 1962, the Model Penal Code
removed sodomy from its list of crimes.196 Illinois, by enacting the
code, became the first state to decriminalize homosexual sex be-
tween consenting adults.197 In the following decades, an increasing
number of states abolished laws criminalizing homosexual relations
between consenting adults, and several of the major states enacted
laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexuality in em-
ployment and housing.198 At the federal level, recognition of gay
rights began with executive action: President Clinton’s “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” Directive,199 which modified, to the extent possible,
195. For a history of this movement, see generally BARRY D. ADAM, THE RISE OF A GAY AND
LESBIAN MOVEMENT (1987); JOHN D’EMILIO, MAKING TROUBLE: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY,
POLITICS, AND THE UNIVERSITY (1992); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS:
SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861-2003 (2008) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE
PASSIONS]; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET
(1999); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002).
196. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 note on status of section (Proposed Official Draft 1962);
see ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 195, at 121-24.
197. Criminal Code of 1961, §§ 11-2 to 11-3, 1961 Ill. Laws 1983, 2006, repealed by
Criminal Sexual Assault, Criminal Sexual Abuse—Offenses Created §§ 27-28, 1983 Ill. Laws
7251, 7306; see ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 195, at 124-27.
198. See ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 195, at 194-228, 265-98.
199. A 1982 policy made open declarations of homosexuality grounds for discharge. DEP’T
OF DEFENSE, DOD DIRECTIVE NO. 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS (1982).
This policy was reiterated by statue in 1993 to forestall President Clinton from opening the
military to homosexuals. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-160, § 571(a), 107 Stat. 1547, 1670-71 (1993) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 634).
Clinton responded by amending Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1304.26 in 1993 to modify
Congress’s “Don’t Tell” with a countervailing “Don’t Ask.” The language added by Clinton is
as follows (indicated by italics): 
A person’s sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter, and is
not a bar to service entry or continued service unless manifested by homosexual
conduct in the manner described in [section 654 of Reference (c)]. Applicants for
enlistment, appointment, or induction shall not be asked or required to reveal
whether they are heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual. Applicants also will not
be asked or required to reveal whether they have engaged in homosexual
conduct, unless independent evidence is received indicating an applicant
engaged in such conduct or unless the applicant volunteers a statement that he
or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect.
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DOD DIRECTIVE NO. 1304.26, QUALIFICATION STANDARDS FOR ENLISTMENT,
APPOINTMENT, AND INDUCTION (1993). Congress has since repealed the 1993 statute. See Don’t
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congressional legislation that essentially prohibited homosexuals
from serving in the military.200 It was not until the Obama admin-
istration, however, that Congress repealed the prohibition itself.201
The Supreme Court’s first pronouncement on the constitutionality
of laws criminalizing gay and lesbian sexual relations came in
Bowers v. Hardwick, decided in 1986.202 In upholding the challenged
statute criminalizing sodomy,203 the Court ignored the constitutional
purpose of protecting liberty, which it had already extended to other
aspects of sexual relations in a number of leading cases.204 It also
ignored the constitutionally relevant actions of state legislators, who
had encompassed gay and lesbian relations within the purpose of
protecting liberty by abolishing the laws against such relations.205
Bowers reached its result by characterizing gay and lesbian sex as
a perversion, rather than as an aspect of intimate relations.206 It
described the earlier right-to-privacy cases as involving “family,
marriage or procreation,” which is accurate but over literal, and
declared that “none of the rights announced in those cases bears any
resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to
engage in acts of sodomy.”207 But the expanding concept of liberty
established exactly such a resemblance and the Court should have
recognized that resemblance from the rationale of its prior cases as
well as from the advancing tide of legislation in the gay and lesbian
rights area. That is why the Court, less than twenty years later in
Lawrence v. Texas, could say that “Bowers was not correct when it
was decided, and it is not correct today.”208
A notable feature of the Court’s gay and lesbian rights doctrine is
the correspondence between the changing attitudes of nonjudicial
Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515.
200. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 § 571(a) (1993). 
201. See supra note 199.
202. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
203. Id. at 187-89.
204. Collectively, these cases were the so-called “right to privacy” cases. See, e.g., Carey v.
Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Mark
Strasser, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 117, 143-44
(2011). 
205. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
206. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96.
207. Id. at 190-91.
208. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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actors and the Court’s reversal of Bowers seventeen years later.
Many political scientists see such correspondences as indicating
that the courts are nothing more than policymakers and that their
claim that they are interpreting authoritative legal sources like the
Constitution is merely window dressing.209 Dissenting in Lawrence,
Justice Scalia saw this correspondence as a surrender to popular
opinion.210 Gerald Rosenberg found that most leading Supreme
Court decisions were in fact preceded by legislative trends that
would have continued in the same direction had the Court not
intervened, and he concluded that expecting the Court to be a social
change agent is, as his work’s title implies, a “hollow hope.”211 
But from the perspective of a purpose-based approach to the
Constitution, the relationship can be seen in a different light. As
discussed above, purposes only reveal their meaning to those who
are committed to them over time.212 Although this is a matter of
accepting the pragmatic consequences of the purpose in some
cases—such as the right of free speech during wartime213—it can
also be a matter of developing new understandings about the range
of situations to which the purpose applies. In this difficult and often
disconcerting enterprise, it is always possible to learn and gain
support from those who share that basic purpose. To do so is not a
surrender nor an admission of irrelevance, but rather it is the kind
of cooperative relationship that is so often needed in these circum-
stances. 
209. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY 295-323 (5th ed.
2001); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 22-36, 50-51 (1998); VICTOR
G. ROSENBLUM, LAW AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT (1955); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 1-25 (2002); Robert A.
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J.
PUB. L. 279 (1957); Donald L. Horowitz, Social Policy and Judicial Capacity, in COURTS, LAW
AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES 34, 34-41 (S. Sidney Ulmer ed., 1981).
210. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion is the product of
a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-
called homosexual agenda.”).
211. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 415-19, 430 (2d ed. 2008).
212. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
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3. Equality
The same observations can be made regarding the constitutional
purpose of equality, which was reaffirmed and strengthened by the
Civil War Amendments.214 No one at the time these Amendments
were adopted could have had any doubt that they applied to African
Americans.215 But when Plessy v. Ferguson presented the constitu-
tionality of racial segregation at the end of the nineteenth century,
the Supreme Court was unwilling to confront the consequences of
the Amendments’ purpose.216 It was certainly apparent that
segregation led to devastating inequality. But the South had been
rebuilt based on an elaborate system of apartheid,217 and the Court
in Plessy was unwilling to confront the consequences of unraveling
that system. When the Court did so half a century later,218 it could
well have said that Plessy was wrong at the time it was decided. But
its “all deliberate speed” solution indicated that it still quailed at
the consequence that its decision would unravel the South’s social
system.219 The Court would need assistance from elected officials
before its effort to implement equality could be even partially suc-
cessful. This is not to condemn the Warren Court for lack of courage
nor to assert, as Rosenberg’s argument does, that the judicial
decision did not really matter.220 The point, rather, is that it is often
truly difficult to remain true to one’s purposes in real-world
214. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
215. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879) (“[The Fourteenth
Amendment] is one of a series of constitutional provisions having a common purpose; namely,
securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that through many generations had been held
in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy.”), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975).
216. 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896), overruled by Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (recognizing that
“the object of the [Fourteenth A]mendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality
of the two races before the Law” but determining that such an object “could not have intended
to abolish distinctions based upon color”).
217. See, e.g., EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER
RECONSTRUCTION 132-59 (1992); DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE
RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 39-57
(2008); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 11-29 (3d rev. ed. 1974). 
218. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494-95 (overruling Plessy’s separate but equal doctrine).
219. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II ), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (stating that lower “courts
will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance”
with the Court’s decision in Brown I ).
220. See ROSENBERG, supra note 211.
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situations, even when the dictates of those purposes are reasonably
clear.
Applying the purpose of equality to women presented a concep-
tual difficulty, rather than a pragmatic one. The canonical formula-
tion of this purpose in the Declaration of Independence raises the
issue: When people in the eighteenth century said “men,” were they
really thinking that the term included women? After virtually con-
tinuous unequal treatment during all three millennia of recorded
history, it was not easy for the nine men on the Supreme Court to
recognize the full meaning of equality in terms of gender. In fact,
the implementation of the constitutional purpose in this case was
carried out by nineteenth century legislatures that enacted married
women’s property acts,221 by the Nineteenth Amendment to the
Constitution,222 by a social movement that spanned the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries,223 and by the Civil Rights Act of 1964,224
which almost inadvertently included “sex” as an invalid basis for
employment determinations.225 The Court did not strike down a
gender classification until 1971226 and did not apply heightened
221. See ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN,
1800-1861 (1987); Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married Women’s Property
Law: Reception of the Early Married Women’s Property Acts by Courts and Legislatures, 29
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3, 3-5 (1985); Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-
1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1365-72 (1983).
222. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
223. For a history of the Women’s Rights Movement, see generally SARA EVANS, PERSONAL
POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW
LEFT (1979); ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, NO TURNING BACK: THE HISTORY OF FEMINISM AND THE
FUTURE OF WOMEN (2002); ETHEL KLEIN, GENDER POLITICS: FROM CONSCIOUSNESS TO MASS
POLITICS (1984); JEAN V. MATTHEWS, THE RISE OF THE NEW WOMAN: THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT
IN AMERICA, 1875-1930, at 45-119 (2003); SALLY G. MCMILLEN, SENECA FALLS AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE WOMEN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2008).
224. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
225. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115-19 (1985) (explaining how the word “sex” was added to
Title VII of the Civil Rights bill by a floor amendment in the House proposed by Howard
Smith, an inveterate opponent of civil rights legislation, in the hope of rendering the bill
politically unacceptable); Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. REV. 431, 439-42 (1966). 
226. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (using rational basis review to invalidate
an Idaho law that ranked men above similarly situated women in choosing estate
administrators).
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scrutiny to such classifications until 1976.227 Unless one is willing
to assert that the Court made a mistake in using a higher standard
of review in 1976 than it did in 1971, the only plausible explanation
is that interpreting a constitutional provision like the Equal
Protection Clause involves a learning process. Provisions of this
kind cannot be interpreted according to their explicit language or
even according to the conscious intent of their framers. Rather, such
provisions can only be understood as expressions of underlying
purposes that reveal their meaning over time.228 
II. POSITIVE RIGHTS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
A. The Idea of Positive Rights
As the preceding Part suggests, the progressive revelation of our
Constitution’s meaning has moved constitutional doctrine in a
particular direction that is consistent with the document’s underly-
ing purposes: toward greater equality and greater liberty for
citizens. It would not be difficult to demonstrate that doctrine has
moved in the direction of a stronger national government as well.
This is not to minimize the difficulties of determining what con-
stitutes more equality, more liberty, and a stronger government, nor
to deny that the movement has not been steady or consistent. But
if we adopt a reasonably long temporal perspective, that movement
seems quite clear. It would be difficult to argue, for example, that
citizen equality or liberty has not increased over the course of the
post-World War II era, between 1945 and 2011, or that the federal
government has not become more powerful during that same time. 
This observation is admittedly teleological, but only in a cultural
sense, not in a philosophical one. It does not adopt Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statics and reason that human development
inevitably moves in a particular direction.229 Rather, the argument
is that our nation, in understanding and developing the purposes to
227. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-204 (1976) (using intermediate scrutiny to
invalidate an Oklahoma law that established different drinking ages for men and women). 
228. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
229. See HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS OR THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN
HAPPINESS SPECIFIED AND THE FIRST OF THEM DEVELOPED (Augustus M. Kelley 1969) (1851);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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which it committed itself at its inception, will move in one direction
as long as we maintain our commitment to those purposes. This is
certainly not inevitable. Present trends might reverse; the future
might even come to resemble the worlds that Aldous Huxley, George
Orwell, and Margaret Atwood envisioned.230 But this does not seem
likely at the present time. Of course, our current political scene is
filled with controversy, much of which clusters around issues of
equality, liberty, and national authority. But these issues have
always been controversial, and while current controversies seem
particularly intense because they are salient to us, a moment’s
reflection will suggest that they can hardly be described as more
severe than those that occurred in the Civil Rights Era, the
Progressive Era, or the Civil War. 
An interesting question, then, is where we as a nation might be
headed. What new constitutional doctrines will emerge if present
trends continue and the meaning of our Constitution’s purposes
continue to be revealed to us by changing circumstances and con-
tinued conceptual development? The answer is perhaps easier for us
than it was for the Framers of our Constitution because we no
longer represent the world’s most advanced thought about these
purposes. Political philosophers have been discussing the developing
conception of liberty and equality for many decades, and in doing so
have often focused on the idea of positive rights, sometimes called
second-generation rights.231 A number of nations have already
codified these rights in their own constitutions,232 and they are
230. See MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (1986) (envisioning a fundamentalist
dystopia); ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932) (envisioning a capitalist dystopia);
GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949) (envisioning a totalitarian dystopia).
231. See, e.g., JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 30-31
(2d ed. 2003); WILLIAM F. FELICE, TAKING SUFFERING SERIOUSLY: THE IMPORTANCE OF
COLLECTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 144 (1996); JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 12, 96 (2008);
PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 20-
21 (2d ed. 2003); JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 111 (2d ed. 2007);
HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 35-53 (2d
ed. 1996).
232. Perhaps the one that has received the most attention is South Africa. Its Constitution
of 1996 contains the following provisions: Article 24’s right to a healthful environment; Article
26's “right to have access to adequate housing”; Article 27’s rights to “have access to a. health
care services, including reproductive health care; b. sufficient food and water; and c. social
security”; and Article 29’s right to education. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, available at
http://www.info.gov.Za/documents/constitution/. Articles 30 and 31 grant group rights. Id.; see
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prominently featured in the United Nations Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.233 Although the recognition of such rights would
represent a major and highly controversial development for
American constitutional law, it is by now a fairly well-marked path
that we can follow. Perhaps the fact that we, unlike our forebears,
would not play the leading role in this enterprise might discourage
us from pursuing it. But we should certainly not make our decisions
on the basis of a sense of wounded pride, and we will hardly assume
leadership of any sort by refusing to change or by oscillating back
and forth along the boundaries of the same rights that we have
already recognized. In the end, moreover, it may turn out that we
still have something to teach the world about the mechanisms by
which positive rights can be secured.
Positive rights are generally defined as legally enforceable claims
to food, shelter, health care, education, and sometimes employ-
ment.234 They are called positive rights because they require the
Richard I. Goldstone, A South African Perspective on Social and Economic Rights, 13 HUM.
RTS. BRIEF 4, 4-6 (2006); Mark S. Kende, The South African Constitutional Court’s Embrace
of Socio-Economic Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 137, 142-47 (2003). For
a discussion of the modern trend towards increasing acceptance of positive rights around the
world, see SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 21-26 (1991) (examining the democratization of Latin America and Asia
after the 1970s); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 864, 868-72 (1986) (discussing the German constitution); Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in
Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 521-29 (1992).
233. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948). Articles 2-21 articulate a full set of negative rights, including
a few that might be regarded at the outer edge of this concept, such as the right to asylum in
Article 14. Id. art. 2-21. Articles 22-26 specifically affirm positive rights: the right to social
security, the right to employment, the right to rest and leisure, the right to health and well-
being, and the right to an education. Id. art. 22-26. Article 25 is most relevant to this
discussion. It reads: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
Id. art. 25. For the background of the Universal Declaration, see MARY ANN GLENDON, A
WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
xv-xxi (2001); JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS,
DRAFTING, AND INTENT ix-xiv (1999). 
234. See John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and International Human Rights
Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 1745 (2009); Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for
Government Work: The Interpretation of Positive Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions,
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state to take initiatives and, more mundanely, but perhaps more
significantly, to appropriate funds.235 They stand in contrast to neg-
ative rights, which forbid the state from taking action of some
kind.236 Thus, to grant citizens a right to freely exercise their
religion, the state, at least in theory, need not take any action at all;
all it need do is avoid taking certain actions.237 To grant citizens a
right to decent housing, in contrast, requires the allocation of
resources to ensure a material condition. The term second-genera-
tion rights derives from the idea that negative rights were the
original, or first-generation, rights, and that positive rights come
later.238 Third generation rights, incidentally, are those that can be
asserted by a group of people regarding the conditions of the group,
such as its ability to maintain its language.239 Second-generation
rights, like first-generation rights, are typically asserted by indiv-
iduals.240
73 ALB. L. REV. 1459, 1464 (2010).
235. Mark Tushnet, Essay, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49 VA. J.
INT’L L. 985, 999 (2009).
236. The terminology comes from a seminal article by Isaiah Berlin. See BERLIN, supra note
85, at 121-22; see also infra notes 363-68 and accompanying text.
237. Cf. Faisal Bhabha, Institutional Access-to-Justice: Judicial, Legislative and Grassroots
Dimensions, 33 QUEEN’S L.J. 139, 157 n.63 (2007).
238. The origins of negative rights are often traced back to the Middle Ages. See BRIAN
TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW AND
CHURCH LAW, 1150-1625, at 28-29, 343 (1997); RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES:
THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 5-7 (1979); Arthur Stephen McGrade, Ockham and the Birth
of Individual Rights, in AUTHORITY AND POWER: STUDIES ON MEDIEVAL LAW AND GOVERNMENT
PRESENTED TO WALTER ULLMANN ON HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY 149, 149-53 (Brian Tierney
& Peter Linehan eds., 1980); Arthur Stephen McGrade, Rights, Natural Rights, and the
Philosophy of Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATER MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM THE
REDISCOVERY OF ARISTOTLE TO THE DISINTEGRATION OF SCHOLASTICISM, 1100-1600, at 738,
738-42 (Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny & Jan Pinborg eds., 1982). Other scholars argue
that rights originated in the early modern period, see MACPHERSON, supra note 26, at 263-69,
or the Enlightenment, see LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY 26-32 (2007),
which is certainly the latest plausible date. Positive rights, on the other hand, are generally
regarded as a product of twentieth-century thought. See G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional
Design and State Constitutional Interpretation, 72 MONT. L. REV. 7, 12 (2011). See generally
DONNELLY, supra note 231. 
239. They are also called group rights. See DONNELLY, supra note 231, at 204-24; FELICE,
supra note 231, at 1-3; GRIFFIN, supra note 231, at 256-76; WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL
CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 1, 35 (1995); Michael Hartney, Some
Confusions Concerning Collective Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 202, 202
(Will Kymlicka ed., 1995); Darlene M. Johnston, Native Rights as Collective Rights: A
Question of Group Self-Preservation, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES, supra, at 179.
240. Natsu Taylor Saito, Beyond Civil Rights: Considering “Third Generation” International
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A fairly substantial body of scholarly literature argues that
positive rights should be recognized as part of our Constitution.241
Generally, such arguments have focused on the meaning of specific
constitutional clauses.242 The argument here is that positive rights
are the next phase in the revelation of our purposes, an expression
and embodiment of our evolving understanding of equality and
liberty. Positive rights would not necessarily represent a further
strengthening of the national government, because state govern-
ments could fully satisfy positive rights, and, indeed, these rights
fall securely into the areas that are classically reserved to the
states.243 But as a practical matter, the national government is
likely to take a leading role in advancing these rights.244 The result
is that the national government will be strengthened, not in the
fairly trivial sense that it will add additional functions, but in the
deeper sense that it will play a more important role in the lives of
many of its citizens.
Although the Constitution does not have minimal housing or
elementary and secondary education clauses, we can certainly find
Human Rights Law in the United States, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 387, 395 (1997).
241. E.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 207 (2004); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:
A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2346-47 (1990); Albert M. Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and
the Constitution, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 407-08 (1966); Michael J. Gerhardt, Essay, The Ripple
Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND.
L. REV. 409, 412-13 (1990); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative
Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1984); Stephen Loffredo, Poverty,
Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1993); Frank I.
Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’ Theory of Justice,
121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 966 (1973) [hereinafter Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional
Welfare Rights]; Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9-11 (1969)
[hereinafter Michelman, On Protecting the Poor]; Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a
Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659, 659-60; Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the
American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 4-5
(2005); William E. Forbath, Review Essay, Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other
Rights Talk? Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771,
1771-73 (1994) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993)). 
242. See, e.g., Michelman, On Protecting the Poor, supra note 241, at 11 (suggesting the
Equal Protection Clause).
243. See Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights
Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1057,
1057-59 (1993); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (1999).
244. See infra Part II.B.
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a basic commitment to positive rights in the previously quoted and
overly familiar words of the Declaration and the Preamble.245 The
Declaration not only mentions liberty but also the pursuit of hap-
piness.246 The Preamble speaks of establishing justice, promoting
the general welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty.247 The text
of the Constitution, and specifically the Fourteenth Amendment, is
certainly capacious enough to include positive rights.248 This is not
to say that the language compels recognition of these rights. The
conclusion that positive rights represent a plausible interpretation
of the Constitution relies on the interpretative approach outlined in
the preceding Part,249 namely, that the Constitution is in essence an
intentional or purposive document, and that the meaning of those
purposes is only revealed over time.250
To expect explicit language regarding positive rights is a brute
anachronism, akin to asking why the Constitution excludes the air
force from the nation’s military powers, or why the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause fails to mention prisons.251 Positive
rights belong to the realm of changing circumstances, the first way
245. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
248. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person ... the equal protection of the
laws.”).
249. See supra Part I.C.
250. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 302-14.
251. This may seem like a simplistic example, but the point is apparently lost on Justice
Thomas. He has repeatedly insisted that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause was not intended to apply to prisons. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 19 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Surely prison was not a more congenial place in
the early years of the Republic than it is today; nor were our judges and commentators so
naive as to be unaware of the often harsh conditions of prison life. Rather, they simply did not
conceive of the Eighth Amendment as protecting inmates from harsh treatment.”); see also
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(reaffirming his view that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to prisons); Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same). 
The difficulty is that there were no prisons in the United States, and perhaps the world at
that time: Philadelphia’s Walnut Street prison, a pioneering effort, was established the same
year the Eighth Amendment was enacted. See BLAKE MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A
STUDY IN AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY PRIOR TO 1915, at 7 (1936); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE
DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 61 (rev. ed.
1990). 
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that purposes reveal their meaning over time,252 because they only
become possible once government, at either the state or federal
level, has developed administrative capacities. They also belong to
the realm of developing conceptions, the second mode of revela-
tion.253 The people who drafted the Constitution, and those who
ratified it, grew up under an autocratic colonial regime whose
control seemed all the more oppressive because it treated them so
much more harshly than it treated its own citizens in the mother
country.254 Their immediate concern was to end the oppressions that
were so salient to them and then to create a new government for
themselves that would never repeat those oppressions. We all
recognize the time-bound character of the Declaration’s list of
grievances, and the Third Amendment’s prohibition on quartering
soldiers in private homes,255 an outmoded military device that
modern governments, even totalitarian ones, no longer employ. Just
as our founding documents explicitly address issues that are no
longer of concern, they also omit issues that were not of concern at
the time but have arisen during the centuries that followed. 
The literature on this subject has widely discussed the way that
positive rights advance the purposes of equality and liberty. One
common rationale is grounded on the central role of political par-
ticipation in our democratic system: as Bruce Ackerman has
pointed out, people are not required to participate, but the system
as a whole depends heavily on their willingness to do so.256 In
addition, we regard political participation as an inherent value,
something that many people find deeply important and believe
should be robustly protected.257 Positive rights are then regarded as
252. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 309-15 (considering examples of such changing
circumstances and how such changes reveal the meaning of purposes over time).
253. See id. at 315-18 (discussing examples of such developing conceptions and how those
conceptions reveal the meaning of statutes over time).
254. EDWARD COUNTRYMAN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 105 (1985).
255. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
256. Cf. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 302 (1980).
257. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-25 (1958); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE
SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 141-42,
374-78 (1993); CAROL C. GOULD, RETHINKING DEMOCRACY: FREEDOM AND SOCIAL COOPERATION
IN POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY 81, 84-85 (1988); PAUL HIRST, ASSOCIATIVE DEMOCRACY:
NEW FORMS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 74-75 (1994); MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 128-33 (1996); PHILIP
SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY
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instrumental to participation: people are unlikely to participate if
they lack the basic necessities of life, and they cannot participate
effectively if they are uneducated.258 To put the point another way,
if people are disenfranchised by starvation, they are certainly not
equal to their more prosperous co-citizens, and their essential
liberty to participate has been infringed.259 
A second way that positive rights are connected to equality and
liberty is noninstrumental. We often think of equality as involving
the difference between the richest and the poorest members of soc-
iety, sometimes measured by a device called the Gini Coefficient.260
This is normatively troublesome as a basis for positive rights,
however, because it appears to valorize envy.261 A different notion
of equality posits that everyone is entitled to minimally adequate
material conditions of life.262 The connection with equality is that
these minimally adequate conditions represent the recognition that
every person is a valuable human being, a citizen of Kant’s kingdom
of ends.263 It is possible, moreover, to connect this notion back to the
314-18 (1992).
258. See Sotirios A. Barber, Welfare and the Instrumental Constitution, 42 AM. J. JURIS.
159, 177-78 (1997); Peter B. Edelman, Essay, The Next Century of Our Constitution:
Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 34 (1987); Charles A. Reich, The Liberty
Impact of the New Property, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 295, 298-99 (1990).
259. This rationale excludes a positive right to employment, which must be distinguished
from the negative right to work. If one has the basic necessities of life, being unemployed
certainly does not interfere with one’s political participation.
260. See JAMES FOSTER & AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 29-31 (rev. ed. 1997);
see also AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 104 (1992).
261. The usual view of moral philosophers is that envy is something to be avoided. See
JOSEPH EPSTEIN, ENVY: THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS 1 (2003); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE
GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 52 (Keith Ansell-Pearson ed., Carol Diethe trans., 1994) (1887);
RAWLS, supra note 63, at 530-41.
262. See, e.g., FELICE, supra note 231, at 18; NICKEL, supra note 231, at 94-95, 100;
Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 241, at 975, 985. Shue
articulates this point: 
This book is about the moral minimum—about the lower limits on tolerable
human conduct, individual and institutional. It concerns the least that every
person can demand and the least that every person, every government, and
every corporation must be made to do. In this respect the bit of theory presented
here belongs to one of the bottom corners of the edifice of human values. About
the great aspirations and exalted ideals, saintly restraint and heroic fortitude
and awesome beauties that enrich life, nothing appears here.... 
This is a book only about where decent life starts.
SHUE, supra note 231, at ix.
263. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785), reprinted
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differences between rich and poor, but in a more morally attractive
way, by noting that wealth has decreasing marginal utility.
Whether one is starving or has enough to eat makes an enormous
difference in one’s life; whether one has enough to eat or whether
one can dine on caviar and truffles makes less of a difference. In
short, the gap between someone who is starving and a rich person
is much greater than the gap between someone who has just enough
to eat and that same rich person.264 Thus, satisfying minimal needs
significantly increases social equality.
With respect to liberty, we could invoke Franklin Roosevelt’s
sonorous phrase that a basic component of human freedom is
freedom from want, but this is uncomfortably close to a play on
words.265 A somewhat more concrete formulation asserts that liberty
involves the absence of external constraints that unnecessarily
interfere with one’s ability to live as one desires.266 Suppression of
one’s speech or prohibition of one’s religion certainly has this effect,
but so do hunger, homelessness, or illness. The point here is not
that these conditions stop a person from doing other things—the
instrumental approach—but rather that these conditions are, in
themselves, experienced as constraints. To develop this claim more
fully, the word “unnecessarily” would need to be unpacked. For
present purposes, it is sufficient to note that constraints like prop-
erty rules can be seen as necessary interferences because simply
taking someone else’s property, such as a car, interferes with that
person’s liberty to use that property. Providing everyone with the
basic necessities of life does not have such an effect on others, at
least in a reasonably prosperous society such as our own.267
in ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 39-44 (James W. Ellington trans., 1983).
264. More precisely, the difference in the gap between the starving person and the rich
person, on the one hand, and the minimally fed person and the rich person on the other, is
larger than the difference between the starving person and the minimally fed person. Thus,
providing minimal sustenance increases equality by an amount greater than its cost. An even
stronger connection with equality could be demonstrated if the difference between the
starving person and the minimally fed person could be shown to be greater than the difference
between the minimally fed person and the rich person, but this point is unclear. 
265. “Unless There Is Security Here at Home, There Cannot Be Lasting Peace in the
World” — Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1944-45 PUB. PAPERS &
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 34 (Jan. 11, 1944).
266. E.g., DONALD VANDEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BONDS OF
BENEVOLENCE 30 (1986).
267. But see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 169-72 (1974) (arguing that
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B. Statutes as Declarations of Positive Rights
Based on the long-acting trend toward the expansion of equality
and liberty rights, on the arguments in the preceding Part,268 and on
the new constitutions that other nations are drafting,269 it might
seem that the recognition of positive rights would be the next major
development in American constitutional law. But a survey of
current constitutional doctrine casts serious doubt on this conclu-
sion. The contemporary Court, while not overtly hostile to rights
claims, seems to prefer retrenchments and clarifications to major
innovations.270 Moreover, after strongly indicating in a series of
cases decided during the 1970s and 1980s that it would not
recognize positive rights,271 the Court in 1989 explicitly declared
taxation for purposes other than physical security is equivalent to compelled labor); see also
infra note 376 and accompanying text (discussing this claim). For the present, we can
distinguish between taxation, which only reduces the total resources available to a person by
a specified amount, and compulsion to perform specific actions. See Linda Sugin, A
Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 TAX L. REV. 229, 259 (2011). Under this
assumption, a tax would be a constraint on liberty only if it were so onerous that it interfered
with the person’s range of action. Id. Thus it may be necessary to restrict positive rights to
reasonably prosperous countries. Another option is to impose the obligations internationally.
See, e.g., FELICE, supra note 231, at 106-11 (describing how international law could help
solidify the emerging normative framework for global human rights); SHUE, supra note 231,
at 155-74 (recommending minimum requirements by which national governments could
advance human rights transnationally).
268. See supra Part II.A.
269. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
270. For example, the Warren Court established basic criminal procedure protections
regarding police searches and interrogations. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(applying Fifth Amendment self-incrimination requirements to the states and to police
interrogations generally and enforcing these requirements through the exclusionary rule);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying Fourth Amendment search and seizure
requirements to the states and enforcing these requirements through the exclusionary rule).
Recent decisions have either limited those protections, see, e.g., Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct.
1195 (2010) (right to counsel during interrogation does not need to take the precise form of
the warnings prescribed in Miranda); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (resident can
give consent to a warrantless search that incriminates an absent owner) or extended them in
minor ways, see, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (police must adapt
Miranda warnings when interrogating a juvenile and provide additional explanation when
necessary for understanding); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (police may not
conduct a warrantless search of a residence on the basis of one resident’s consent if another
resident objects). There are of course, exceptions to the pattern. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003) (reversing prior decision and striking down state laws criminalizing
homosexual sex). 
271. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (no right to medical care); San Antonio
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that it would not do so in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Depart-
ment of Social Services.272 Justice Rehnquist, writing for a six-
Justice majority, said:
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself
requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors. The Clause is
phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It
forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or
property without “due process of law,” but its language cannot
fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the
State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through
other means.273 
As noted above, however, the court system is not the only insti-
tution that interprets the Constitution.274 Legislatures do so as well
when they enact statutes that advance the Constitution’s purposes.
To reiterate, this is not because they change the political climate,
enabling the courts to reach decisions that would have been polit-
ically unacceptable prior to the statutory enactments. That effect
undoubtedly occurs, but its judicial results are difficult to justify in
normative terms. Rather, statutes affect judicial interpretation of
the Constitution because the statutes themselves are interpreta-
tions. They represent the legislature’s contribution to the interpre-
tive process by which the meaning of the Constitution, as a purpose-
based document, is revealed to us over time.275 Thus, if we want to
know the current state of constitutional thinking about positive
rights, we need to look to statutes as well as to decided cases.
The relevant statutory enactments occur at both the federal
and state levels, of course. State enactments are just as important
as federal ones in understanding how statutes interpret the
Constitution. The Constitution fully applies to the states, and when
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (no right to an education); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (no right to housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484
(1970) (no right to minimal sustenance).
272. 489 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1989).
273. Id. at 195.
274. See, e.g., supra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
275. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 308-09.
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people perceive something to be a moral imperative, they will strive
to implement it at every level of government. In fact, as indicated
above, much of the legislation that contributed to our understanding
of equality for women, racial minorities, and homosexuals was
enacted by the states.276 This Part will focus on federal legislation,
however. To some extent, this is simply for brevity of presentation.
In addition, however, a major element in the analysis, for reasons
that will appear below, is the nationwide reach of federal legislation,
one feature that state legislation cannot possess.
At the federal level, there have been a number of major enact-
ments that implement the Constitution’s purposes by establishing
positive rights. The first comprehensive federal legislative effort to
provide Americans with the basic necessities of life was the Social
Security Act.277 Franklin Roosevelt famously structured this Act,
against the advice of his economic advisors, as an insurance pro-
gram funded by payroll taxes, rather than as a welfare program, to
preclude its repeal or retrenchment.278 His political judgment, in
this area as in so many others, was unerring. The usual account of
why this strategy worked is that the Social Security Act’s old age
payments were conceived of as a property right that people had
earned rather than as a form of welfare.279 A related reason for the
program’s success was that it did not grant universal benefits but
applied only to the presumptively virtuous people who had worked
for a living before they reached the required age.280 Although not
structured as insurance, the Social Security Act’s disability benefits
possess this second characteristic as well. These benefits are avail-
able only to those who can demonstrate that they are unable to
work; in other words, people who would work if they possibly
could.281 Again, the Social Security Act’s provisions for disability
276. See supra notes 196-97, 214, 222 and accompanying text.
277. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.). 
278. See NANCY J. ALTMAN, THE BATTLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: FROM FDR’S VISION TO
BUSH’S GAMBLE 82-83 (2005); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE
NEW DEAL, 1932-1940, at 132 (1963).
279. See, e.g., LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 278, at 132-33.
280. See id. at 132.
281. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY CLAIMS 23-24 (1983).
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benefits move toward a regime of positive rights without expressly
acknowledging this intention.282
The federal effort to ensure that every American has sufficient
food can be conceived as a universal welfare right, and suffers from
political vulnerability as a result. The effort is colloquially known as
the Food Stamp Program after the device used to distribute funds
to needy Americans so that they can purchase a minimally adequate
amount of food for themselves and their families.283 Franklin
Roosevelt’s Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, established the
first Food Stamp Program in 1939, permitting people on relief to
purchase orange stamps that could be used to pay for food at a
discounted rate.284 The Program ended in 1943 and was not revived
by the Truman administration.285 In 1959, Congress passed a
federal food stamp act,286 which the Kennedy administration im-
plemented on a pilot basis in 1961.287 In 1964, as part of his War on
Poverty, Lyndon B. Johnson urged and obtained enactment of the
current Food Stamp Act,288 a comprehensive law providing food
relief to needy Americans.289 The 1964 Act required the states to
develop eligibility standards and provided that people who met
those standards could purchase food stamps that could be redeemed
282. See generally ALTMAN, supra note 278; DANIEL BÉLAND, SOCIAL SECURITY: HISTORY
AND POLITICS FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE PRIVATIZATION DEBATE (2005).
283. Patti S. Landers, The Food Stamp Program: History, Nutrition Education, and Impact,
107 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 1945, 1945 (2007). See generally RONALD F. KING, BUDGETING
ENTITLEMENTS: THE POLITICS OF FOOD STAMPS (2000).
284. Landers, supra note 283, at 1946.
285. Id. In part, Truman may have declined to revive the program because he owed his
vice-presidential nomination in 1944—and thus his presidency—to the fact that Wallace, the
front runner for the vice-presidential nomination, was perceived as too radical by the power
brokers in the Democratic Party. See CONRAD BLACK, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT:
CHAMPION OF FREEDOM 965 (2003); JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE SOLDIER OF
FREEDOM 503-05 (1970); DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 293-304 (1992). The Eisenhower
administration had declined to implement the program. Id. at 424.
286. Act of Sept. 21, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-341, § 11, 73 Stat. 606, 608-09.
287. See Karen Terhune, Comment, The Reformation of the Food Stamp Act: Abating
Domestic Hunger Means Resisting “Legislative Junk Food,” 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 421, 421
(1992). The Eisenhower administration had declined to implement the program.
288. See Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, §§ 5-7, 78 Stat. 703, 704-05 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
289. Brendan Mahiren, Recent Development, The U.S. and Them: Cutting Federal Benefits
to Legal Immigrants, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 319, 325 (1995).
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for amounts of food whose value exceeded the amount they had paid
for the stamps.290
The Program grew rapidly and has been the subject of repeated
federal enactments. Some of these enactments expanded the pro-
gram and made it easier for people to use. The Food Stamp Act of
1977 provided that eligible citizens would be given food stamps
directly, eliminating the requirement that they buy the stamps.291
The Electronic Benefit Transfer Interoperability and Portability Act
of 2000 began the process of replacing the stamps with an authori-
zation card that could draw on funds that the federal government
deposited in a designated account.292 This was partially to realize
the efficiencies that electronic funds transfers had already demon-
strated in the private sector, and partially to remove the stigma
attached to the program by replacing the sui generis stamps with a
payment device resembling the credit cards that everyone else
used.293 There were also a variety of efforts to limit the program by
reducing fraud, eliminating certain categories of participants such
as students, illegal aliens, and the voluntarily unemployed, and
reducing the level of benefits.294 Overall, however, participation
increased rapidly, reaching a total of 29 million Americans by
2008.295 In that same year, Congress passed the Food, Conservation,
290. Food Stamp Act of 1964 §§ 4-5.
291. Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, sec. 1301, § 7(b), 91 Stat. 958, 967
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2016 (2006)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-464, at 238-39
(1977) (reviewing the testimony offered in favor of eliminating the purchase requirement
provision).
292. Electronic Benefit Transfer Interoperability and Portability Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-171, sec. 3, § 7(k), 114 Stat. 3, 3-4 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2016 (2006)).
293. Martha B. Coven, Essay, The Freedom to Spend: The Case for Cash-Based Public
Assistance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 847, 892 (2002).
294. See Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
Agencies Appropriation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549A, 1549A-23 to 1549A-
25 (2000) (reducing funding levels); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2315 (1996) (declaring ineligible any
person who voluntarily quits a job or cuts back a job to less than thirty hours per week); Food
Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913, 964-67 (requiring recipients to register
for work and not leave existing employment without good cause, excluding students who are
claimed as dependents by a noneligible household and requiring them to register for work
when school is in recess for more than 30 days, and excluding illegal aliens). Many of these
provisions once again indicate our strong national preference for those who work. See
KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, NO SHAME IN MY GAME: THE WORKING POOR IN THE INNER CITY 86-89
(1999). 
295. Sheila Fleischhacker & Joel Gittelsohn, Carrots or Candy in Corner Stores?: Federal
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and Energy Act, increasing the funds for the program by more
than $10 billion over the next ten years. The 2008 Act also changed
the program’s name to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program,296 thereby creating the sprightly acronym of SNAP—
another attempt to reduce the stigma associated with the program.
When George W. Bush vetoed the legislation, Congress passed it
over his veto, an unusual occurrence indicating the level of support
for the 2008 Act, as well as the hostility toward Bush. 
In short, over the past fifty years, the federal government has
gradually instituted a statutory program that provides at least a
certain level of food security to a large number of Americans. The
Food Stamp Program’s dramatic expansion and political resilience
suggest that the nation is gradually recognizing that there is a right
to sustenance.297 Exclusions from the eligibility rules have generally
been based on conditions that do not detract from the commitment
to ending hunger in America; these exclusions are concerned with
people who do not need the assistance, such as students, or people
who are not considered American citizens, such as illegal aliens.298
But the program has not been fully successful in achieving its goals,
and it remains a subject of controversy.299 As supporters’ repeated
efforts to reduce the stigma associated with providing assistance to
the poor indicates, there remains continued resistance to the idea
that everyone in the nation is entitled to a minimally adequate
amount of food. 
Facilitators and Barriers to Stocking Healthier Options, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 23, 36 (2010).
296. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 4002, 122 Stat.
923, 1092 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
297. Writing in the William and Mary Law Review, Charles Reich put the point as follows:
[T]he idea that food stamps are a privilege has been invalidated by changing
reality. Our original condition was a world in which people could support
themselves by working on the land. Now we live in a world in which you starve
unless you can obtain a contract with an organization. We might see food stamps
as a barely adequate substitute for the free land that is no longer available. As
individuals, we have exchanged free land for social insurance. Minimal support
must now be part of the social contract because large organizations have
monopolized the means of survival.
Reich, supra note 258, at 299.
298. See sources cited supra note 294.
299. See JOEL BERG, ALL YOU CAN EAT: HOW HUNGRY IS AMERICA 32-34 (2008); PETER K.
EISINGER, TOWARD AN END TO HUNGER IN AMERICA 38-39, 63 (1998).
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Federal support for the provision of housing can be described as
bifurcated between the Social Security model and the Food Stamp
model. The federal government does not build or manage civilian
housing units directly but rather provides various forms of financial
support to institutions that undertake such activities. It offers some
of this financial support through three federal organizations, col-
loquially known as Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, and Freddie Mac,
which guarantee home mortgages or create a secondary market for
them, thus inducing financial institutions to issue more mortgages
and to lower the eligibility requirements for the mortgages they
issue.300 Although these organizations were established, in part, to
provide affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families,301
their support is only available to people who can qualify for a
private mortgage.302 This generally requires the recipients to be
employed or have some other fairly significant and reliable source
of income. Being limited to the virtuous, like Social Security, the
programs grew to massive proportions.303 Because they were at least
partially responsible for the recent financial meltdown,304 criticism
of these programs has been legion, but such criticism has largely
concerned their administrative and fiscal mismanagement, not their
underlying goal of helping wage earners become homeowners.305 
300. The first of these institutions, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or
Fannie Mae), was established in 1934 under the authority of the National Housing Act, Pub.
L. No. 73-479, § 301, 48 Stat. 1246, 1252-53 (1934). For an account of Fannie Mae’s origins
and operation, see Oakley Hunter, The Federal National Mortgage Association: Its Response
to Critical Financing Requirements of Housing, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 818 (1971). The
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 established the second of these institutions, the
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae), to extend Fannie Mae’s
mortgage support to government employees and veterans. Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 801, 82 Stat.
476, 536. The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 established the last of these institutions,
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie Mac), to supplement
Fannie Mae. Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 303, 84 Stat. 450, 452-53.
301. Andrea J. Boyack, Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences: The Role and
Control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1489, 1500 (2011).
302. Id. at 1503.
303. JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., THE RISE AND FALL OF THE U.S. MORTGAGE AND CREDIT
MARKETS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET MELTDOWN 175-79 (2009).
304. Boyack, supra note 301, at 1524.
305. See, e.g., VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., GUARANTEED TO FAIL: FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC,
AND THE DEBACLE OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 31-40 (2011); PETER J. WALLISON & BERT ELY,
NATIONALIZING MORTGAGE RISK: THE GROWTH OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 28-47 (2000);
Ron Feldman, Improving Control over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in SERVING TWO
MASTERS, YET OUT OF CONTROL: FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 139, 140-42 (Peter J. Wallison
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A second type of federal housing support consists of funds that the
federal government provides to state and local public housing
programs. After 1965, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) directed this support.306 Very often, these are
need-based programs, which means that eligibility for their benefits
is the mirror image of the mortgage-related programs: having too
much income, rather than too little, excludes potential recipients.307
There has been a somewhat dizzying succession of statutes, but the
major ones have been specifically designed to provide decent
housing for all Americans, regardless of income.308 Unlike the mort-
gage support programs, however, the need-based programs have
been underfunded,309 reflecting our ambivalence about this goal. The
general view is that these programs have been largely ineffective
and have in some cases contributed to residential segregation.310
Nonetheless, new attempts continue to be made, and the goal of
providing adequate housing for all has been reiterated, rather than
repudiated, in the successive enactments.311
ed., 2001).
306. HUD was created by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965. Pub. L. No.
89-117, 79 Stat. 451.
307. For example, a relatively recent statute, the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable
Housing Act of 1990, provides: “[N]ot less than 90 percent of ... the families receiving such
rental assistance [must be] families whose incomes do not exceed 60 percent of the median
family income for the area.” 42 U.S.C. § 12744 (2006). 
308. See, for example, the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079; the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965
(establishing HUD as part of Johnson’s War on Poverty); the Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No.
81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (marking the first major federal initiative as part of Truman’s Fair Deal).
309. See SUSAN J. POPKIN ET AL.  A DECADE OF HOPE VI:  RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY
CHALLENGES, 10, 13 (2004); Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Antipoverty Strategy:
Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. L.J. 1697 (1993); Thomas A. Reiner & Julian
Wolpert, Funding Caps, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 391 (1985)
310. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 195-96 (1993); Florence Wagman
Roisman, The Lessons of American Apartheid: The Necessity and Means of Promoting
Residential Racial Integration, 81 IOWA L. REV. 479, 490-93 (1995) (book review). Another
common criticism is that federally funded urban renewal projects disrupt inner-city
communities. See generally JAMES ROBERT SAUNDERS & RENAE NADINE SHACKELFORD, URBAN
RENEWAL AND THE END OF BLACK CULTURE IN CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA: AN ORAL HISTORY
OF VINEGAR HILL (1998).
311. The Cranston-Gonzalez Act both acknowledged past failures and reiterated the
government’s ongoing aspiration: “[T]he Nation has not made adequate progress toward the
goal of national housing policy, as set out in the Housing Act of 1949 ... and reaffirmed in the
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, which would provide decent, safe, sanitary, and
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III. THE PPACA AND POSITIVE RIGHTS
A. The PPACA as a Declaration of Positive Rights
This brings us to the issue of health care. The federal govern-
ment, of course, mounted a major effort to provide medical services
to American citizens with the enactment of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs in 1965.312 Medicare functions largely as an
adjunct to Social Security. It provides medical benefits to people
who are sixty-five or older and have paid the Social Security payroll
tax.313 It also provides benefits to those under sixty-five who are
receiving Social Security disability insurance.314 Again, this means
that the benefits go to wage earners or disabled former wage
earners.315 Medicaid, in contrast, is a needs-based program to
provide health care to the poor.316 As with most other programs of
this sort, it is administered by the states, with the federal govern-
ment’s role consisting of providing money and setting criteria.317 The
two programs thus exhibit the same bifurcation as the federal
housing program, the bifurcation that divides Social Security from
SNAP.318 Once again, statutory law is moving toward the implemen-
tation of positive rights, that is, toward the idea that every Ameri-
can has a right to food, shelter, health care, and education. And,
affordable living environments for all Americans.” 42 U.S.C. § 12721(1).
312. Health Insurance for the Aged and Medical Assistance, Pub. L. No. 89-79, 79 Stat. 286
(1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also SUE A. BLEVINS,
MEDICARE’S MIDLIFE CRISIS 39-52 (2001); JONATHAN ENGEL, POOR PEOPLE’S MEDICINE:
MEDICAID AND AMERICAN CHARITY CARE SINCE 1965, at 44-51 (2006); THEODORE R. MARMOR,
THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 59-81 (1973); JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF
MEDICARE 17-35 (2003) (detailing early political campaigns for national health insurance and
the political battle over health insurance for the elderly, which ultimately led to Medicare’s
enactment).
313. Jennifer L. Wright, Unconstitutional or Impossible: The Irreconcilable Gap Between
Managed Care and Due Process in Medicaid and Medicare, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
135, 141 (2000).
314. Id.
315. BLEVINS, supra note 312, at 3-12; MARILYN MOON, MEDICARE: A POLICY PRIMER 181-84
(2006).
316. BLEVINS, supra note 312, at 4.
317. See ENGEL, supra note 312, at 48-51; LAURA KATZ OLSON, THE POLITICS OF MEDICAID
30–31, 121-23 (2010).
318. See supra notes 277-305 and accompanying text.
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once again, as in other areas, the movement in health care is halting
and incomplete at the present time because of our cultural and
political ambivalence about providing assistance unrelated to
work.319
The Obama administration’s PPACA is a further step down this
now-familiar, if somewhat tortuous, path.320 One would need a very
carefully developed set of criteria to demonstrate that the PPACA
is a larger step than Medicare and Medicaid. It is a step being taken
in less prosperous times, to be sure, but the mid-1960s were not
exactly a period of tranquility or consensus. Why, then, has this
statute proven so controversial, so incendiary that its opponents
have refused to accept defeat after the bill’s passage? And why has
it generated a powerful social movement organized around its
repudiation? One explanation may be that people sense its potential
for establishing a regime of positive rights. In other words, it
heralds a revolution in our constitutional system, a new way of
thinking about the relationship between citizens and their govern-
ment. Although the nation has been moving incrementally in this
direction since the 1960s, the PPACA is perceived as representing
a dramatic acceleration of the trend. Three of the Act’s central
features explain this largely accurate perception.
First, the PPACA is universal, rather than being limited to a
particular segment of the population.321 Proponents of the Act may
well have imagined that this feature would be politically advanta-
geous because the Act provides benefits for nearly all Americans
and appears to avoid the stigma of a welfare program. But many
perceive the Act’s universality as threatening because it is so all
encompassing. It seems somehow larger than a social program.
However path-breaking Medicare and Medicaid were, these pro-
grams possessed a reassuring specificity: they helped particular
319. See BLEVINS, supra note 312, at 41; ENGEL, supra note 312, at 131-32, 240-43;
BEAUFORT B. LONGEST, JR., HEALTH POLICYMAKING IN THE UNITED STATES 179-80 (5th ed.
2010); OBERLANDER, supra note 312, at 195-96; OLSON, supra note 317, at 234-40; DAVID G.
SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS AND POLICY, 1965-2007, at 372-78 (2008);
CAROL S. WEISSERT & WILLIAM G. WEISSERT, GOVERNING HEALTH: THE POLITICS OF HEALTH
POLICY 385-96 (3d ed. 2006).
320. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
321. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2702, 124 Stat. 119,
156 (2010).
2012] THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1703
groups of people, with particular attributes, even if those groups
were rather large.322 In contrast, the PPACA applies to everyone.
Second, the PPACA is uniform. It puts the wage earners and the
poor in the same boat.323 Previous programs were typically directed
to one group or the other: Social Security, home mortgage support,
and Medicare provided insurance- or financing-type benefits for
wage earners, while food stamps, public housing, and Medicaid pro-
vided welfare-type benefits to the poor.324 As indicated above, that
bifurcation runs through nearly all the social legislation of the past
half century.325 Combining the two groups seems to offend many
people because it is perceived as minimizing the difference that they
are so anxious to maintain. The Tea Party’s hilarious-sounding
plaint—“[K]eep your government hands off my Medicare”326—in fact
reveals a serious concern. People may believe that Medicare, like
Social Security, is something they have earned, not something they
are being given by the government. The government, therefore, is
merely processing the payments that they regard themselves as le-
gitimately entitled to, like a financial institution that returns one’s
investment with interest. Combining Medicare payments with un-
earned benefits for the poor within a single program challenges this
dubious but deeply felt distinction. The PPACA tears the fig leaf of
earned benefits off social legislation and reveals the naked wealth
redistribution that lies underneath.
The third trait that makes the PPACA controversial is that it is
strongly normative. It has been presented as the right thing to do,
and not simply as a good idea, not merely a social program but
a moral imperative.327 Claims of this sort can infuriate one’s
322. See BLEVINS, supra note 312, at 4.
323. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2702.
324. See supra Part II.B.
325. See supra Part II.B.
326. Bob Cesca, Keep Your Goddamn Government Hands Off My Medicare!, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 5, 2009, 6:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bob-cesca/get-your-goddamn-
governme_b_252326.html; Clarence Page, “Keep Government Out of My Medicare?” Not Easy,
CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 9, 2009, 11:24:49 AM), http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/pagespage/
2009/08/medicare-fantasies.html.
327. Dan Gilgoff, Obama Appeals to National Morality in Health Care Reform Speech, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 10, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/god-and-country/
2009/09/10/obama-appeals-to-national-morality-in-healthcare-reform-speech; Jeff Zeleny &
Carl Hulse, Obama Calls Health Plan a ‘Moral Obligation’, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/us/politics/20obama.html; Interview by Jake Tapper with
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opponents and induce them to formulate their own countervailing
claims of right. In the case of the PPACA, this claim is that the Act’s
compulsory insurance provision,328 the individual mandate,
infringes on people’s personal liberty by forcing them to enter into
contracts with private parties.329 
What makes these three features of universality, uniformity and
normativity significant for present purposes is that they possess the
characteristics of a constitutional right. The right of free speech, for
example, exhibits the same three features; it applies to everyone, it
operates for everyone in the same essential way,330 and it can be
regarded as a moral imperative, not just a good idea. All of the
social legislation described above can be regarded as an interpreta-
tion of the Constitution, the first steps toward the recognition of
positive rights to food, shelter, health care, and education.331 But the
PPACA is more obviously a constitutional interpretation than these
other statutes; given its subject matter, it is perhaps inappropriate
to say that it looks, acts, and quacks like a right, but that is in fact
the case. The PPACA thus simultaneously challenges the courts to
think about establishing positive rights as a matter of constitutional
law and facilitates any effort the courts would choose to make along
these lines. It encourages judges to reverse DeShaney and hold the
Due Process Clause guarantees minimal levels of safety and sec-
urity.332 At some level, those who oppose this sea change in our
Barack Obama, President of the United States, in Jamestown, N.C. (Oct. 11, 2011), available
at http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/transcript-abc-news-jake-tappers-exclusive-interview-
president/story?id=14764446&singlepage=true; see also HEALTH CARE STORIES FOR AMERICA
http://stories.barackobama.com/healthcare (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (website sponsored by
President Obama on which people document their health care problems, and described as
stories that “put a human face on the health care crisis”).
328. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119,
242 (2010).
329. Of course, there is not much need to explain why this claim appears in the lawsuits
challenging the Act. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 8. There are not many grounds for
challenging the constitutionality of social welfare legislation, and any decent lawyer faced
with such an uphill climb will grab anything that may be of assistance.
330. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech.”).
331. See supra Part II.B.
332. See supra notes 268-70.
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constitutional structure understand this, and that is what is getting
them so agitated.333
This emerging right to health care can be compared with the
emerging right to education that some commentators have per-
ceived.334 We appear to have the sense as a society that the provision
of elementary and secondary education should be universal and
uniform, and that it represents a moral imperative. This sense is
reflected in compulsory education statutes,335 but these statutes,
although they seem to impose a greater constraint than the
individual mandate, have not engendered the same furious opposi-
tion as the PPACA. One reason, certainly, is that education can be
regarded as conceptually different from social welfare.336 Suffice it
to say that cultural values of this sort often explain why some
people see great differences in things that seem homologous to
others. Another possible explanation is that education was made
compulsory over an extended period of time, and by individual state
enactments, not all at once through high-profile federal legis-
lation.337
B. Statutory Interpretation as a Response to Criticisms of Positive
Rights
The Supreme Court is far from alone in condemning the idea of
positive rights. Many scholars have been highly critical of this
concept, even as a basis for amending the Constitution.338 Very few
are prepared to treat the doctrine of positive rights as a plausible
reading of the Constitution as it stands. The criticisms, however, do
not account for the role that statutes play as interpretations of the
333. Cf. LANDMARK, supra note 6, at 2-3 (describing other things that are making
opponents of the Obama administration upset).
334. E.g., Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the
U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV.
550, 552 (1992).
335. See Melodye Bush, Compulsory School Age Requirements, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE
STATES 1 (last updated June 2010), http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/86/62/8662.pdf
(describing state compulsory education statutes).
336. To explain exactly why would take us back to sixteenth-century Geneva and maybe
fifth-century Athens, which is a bit far afield for this Article.
337. See Bush, supra note 335, at 1-3.
338. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 878-93
(2001).
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Constitution. As noted above, a purposive view of the Constitution
joins legislators with judges as fellow interpreters of the docu-
ment.339 This cooperative relationship can provide at least a partial
answer to the major criticisms that have been advanced against
judicial recognition of positive rights. The PPACA serves as a prime
example of the kind of legislation that can play this interpretive role
and thus counters standard objections advanced against positive
rights. Its potential for doing so may be another source of the anger
that the Act has elicited among some segments of our society.
We can distinguish three major objections to the idea of positive
rights: a pragmatic objection, based on the difficulty of implement-
ing such rights; a political objection, based on positive rights’ poss-
ible interference with the democratic process; and a philosophical
objection, based on the concept of rights itself. 
The pragmatic criticism maintains that positive rights are really
policy decisions masquerading as judicially enforceable principles,
and that courts are ill equipped to make decisions of this sort.340
This argument, although hardly without precedent, is now firmly
associated with the Legal Process School, specifically with its insis-
tence that each governmental institution has inherent strengths
and weaknesses that should determine the allocation of authority.341
As Lon Fuller argued, policy decisions made through adjudication
are polycentric: they involve balancing a variety of interacting
forces, each of which affects the other.342 Courts, in contrast, are
most adept at deciding between two opposing parties presenting
arguments designed to advance their own positions. 
Considering the allocation of financial resources gives this
argument further specificity. The recognition of positive rights could
require massive allocations of funds that are not within the judi-
ciary’s power to provide or its ability to control. Negative rights
simply tell the government to stop doing something;343 they cost the
government no money and might even save it money as it shuts
339. See supra text accompanying notes 113-19.
340. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 338, at 879-80, 887-93.
341. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1482 (2011).
342. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-98
(1978) (defining “polycentric” problems).
343. See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
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down a censorship office or disestablishes state churches. But
positive rights generally involve the kinds of services that constitute
large portions of a governmental budget.344 One possible result is
that these funds would not actually be allocated, reducing the
judiciary’s positive rights rulings to precatory, ineffective declara-
tions that would undermine courts’ ability to enforce the negative
rights that represent their established role. Another possible result
is that political branches would in fact allocate the funds—but
courts would lack the administrative machinery to monitor them.
These concerns are not as serious as they sound, however. To
some extent, they may reflect a simplified, even pre-administrative
image of government that no longer applies. Many negative rights
can only be implemented by affirmative programs that require
serious allocations of funds.345 Assuming that the national govern-
ment accepts the legitimacy of a court’s ruling, significant enforce-
ment expenditures may be needed to implement it. School desegre-
gation is an obvious example, and the prohibition on school prayer
is another. One might imagine stationing a federal marshal in each
noncompliant school, which would certainly cost money, but a more
realistic approach would involve mediation and re-training sessions
that could also be expensive. Either way, a school district is
spending money on enforcing the “negative rights” of equality or
liberty.
In addition, a modern state runs complex institutions, and en-
suring that those institutions meet constitutional standards may
require significant expenditures and extensive management. The
desegregation of public schools is an example here as well, as is the
reform of state prisons that Malcolm Feeley and I studied.346 With
respect to prisons, the Constitution establishes a negative right to
be free from “cruel and unusual punishment.”347 In a modern state,
however, this cannot be implemented by simply firing the guy with
the leather mask and the carving knives; it requires that pris-
344. See supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
345. For arguments that no significant differences exit between positive and negative
rights, see STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES 35-58 (1999); Barber, supra note 258, at 163-65.
346. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998).
347. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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ons—which the government is unlikely to close—be systematically
restructured. The decisions that Feeley and I studied ultimately
enforced the prisoners’ negative rights by requiring that trained
guards be hired, medical services provided, food services reorga-
nized, and new approaches to internal discipline designed.348 All of
this costs money and required extensive management by courts.349
In fact, the courts managed the prison reform process rather well,
and the special masters that the courts hired to assist them350 were
often the very same type of people that a reform governor might
have hired to clean up state prisons if such efforts had been polit-
ically viable.
To the extent that the cost and administrative burdens of imple-
menting positive rights remain a concern, however, partnership
between the legislatures and the courts in constitutional inter-
pretation would go a long way toward alleviating that burden.
Hypothetically, finding a right to sustenance when a large portion
of the nation’s populace is starving and the government has taken
no steps to solve the problem is indeed a daunting task. It is also an
unlikely one. If elected officials—we are assuming a democracy with
judicial review, of course—do not perceive any obligation to resolve
the situation, it is unlikely that the courts will come to the realiza-
tion that the Constitution’s purposes require the recognition of this
right on their own. But if, as in the United States, the legislature
has already taken extensive steps to alleviate hunger351—if it has in
fact perceived that allowing citizens to starve is unacceptable in a
way that courts can treat as an interpretation of the Constitution
—then the courts can recognize that right without creating exces-
sive administrative difficulties for themselves. The courts’ orders
could be directed to the already-established government agency
responsible for administering the food relief program. The effect of
these orders would be to expand that program, possibly in fairly
minor ways, and, in any case, in ways that would be administra-
tively and financially manageable.
348. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 346, at 362-75.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 308-11.
351. See supra notes 283-97 and accompanying text.
2012] THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1709
Moreover, the standards that the courts impose can sometimes be
derived from those that the political branches themselves employ.
In our study of the prison reform cases, Feeley and I found that the
courts based their remedies on the standards developed by the
American Correctional Association (ACA).352 The ACA was not a
governmental body, but its standards represented the prevailing
practices of most non-Southern states and could therefore be used
as a means of correcting the cruel and unusual prison practices that
prevailed in the South.353 
Constitutional courts, as David Strauss and others have observed,
are generally incrementalist institutions.354 They develop constitu-
tional doctrine through a process that resembles their development
of common law.355 Defining rights through a partnership with the
legislature—although preserving courts’ power to make the final
decision—comports with this general methodology. Such an ap-
proach means that courts are unlikely to act in a situation where
the political branches have not taken any measures in the direction
of that action.356 
But this approach also means that constitutionally relevant legis-
lation provides an invitation, and perhaps ultimately an insistence,
that courts reconceptualize their interpretations of the Constitution
along the indicated lines. The extensive and widely supported social
welfare legislation of the last half century is an example of such
invitation and insistence. The PPACA, because it is universal, uni-
form, and normative, presents perhaps the strongest inducement to
the recognition of positive rights in this long line of legislation.357 It
indicates that the DeShaney decision may have made sense in 1840,
or even 1880, but is now an anachronism.358 Its passage refutes the
assertion that the Due Process Clause, or the Equal Protection
352. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 346, at 103-05, 162-66, 370-72.
353. See id. at 162-63.
354. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 113, at 925, 927-31.
355. See id. at 925, 927.
356. Thus, slippery slope arguments, e.g., Ilya Somin, A Mandate for Mandates: Is the
Individual Health Care Insurance Mandate Case a Slippery Slope?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (forthcoming 2012), reveal a profound misunderstanding of the way constitutional law
functions in reality.
357. See supra notes 320-33 and accompanying text.
358. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (denying
the existence of positive rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s two central clauses).
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Clause, “cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative
obligation on the State.”359
The political challenge to the concept of positive rights involves
our theory of democracy. This challenge suggests that the imple-
mentation of positive rights by courts strips elected officials rep-
resenting the populace of the power to make basic policy decisions
and grants that power to unelected judges.360 This is, of course,
another version of the famous counter-majoritarian difficulty that
the Legal Process School developed and championed.361 The Legal
Process School’s answer was to restrict judicial invalidation of
democratically chosen policies to areas where the democratic pro-
cess had failed, either because of defects in its procedures—
malapportionment or restrictions of the franchise, for example—or
because a “discrete and insular” minority was excluded from par-
ticipation in the process.362 Although this approach has certainly
been challenged, it cannot be readily dismissed and would seem to
loom quite large when positive rights such as the right to food,
housing, or health care are considered.
Here again, however, recognizing the role of statutes in interpret-
ing the Constitution alleviates much of the concern. When the
courts act in partnership with the legislature, they can be seen as
supporting democracy, rather than undermining it.363 In that case,
the operation of the democratic process has established the basic
direction and the essential meaning of the Constitution as deter-
mined by its purposes. The role of the courts is consistent with the
role that the Legal Process School would assign to them—to correct
359. See id.
360. Curt Bentley, Comment, Constrained by the Liberal Tradition: Why the Supreme
Court Has Not Found Positive Rights in the American Constitution, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1721,
1741-44.
361. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (2d ed. 1986); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic
Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153,
201-02 (2002). 
362. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 75-76 (1980); JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 119-21, 148-49 (1980).
363. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1301-10 (2005) (discussing
how judicial review can support democracy).
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defects in the process or protect excluded minorities.364 Judicial
decisions could state that food relief, already extensive, should be
universal, or that the government must provide decent shelter for
the homeless, or that egregious underfunding of the public schools
in particular areas must be remedied. Of course, the courts must be
willing to invalidate governmental action in some cases; otherwise,
judicial review is ineffectual. But if that invalidation can be char-
acterized as clarifying, extending, and improving rights that the
political branches have already established, concerns about the
conflict between positive rights and democratic decisionmaking
would be greatly reduced.
A more theoretical, and perhaps more difficult, response to this
concern involves the meaning of the term “democracy.” This word
has gradually evolved from a description to a slogan and, in the
process, we have become somewhat slovenly about its use. In our
society, “democracy” refers to a system of government in which offi-
cials elected by the national or regional majorities of the populace
are authorized to make decisions.365 As a matter of critical morality,
do we really mean that these officials can make any decision? Would
we—that is, each person acting as a critical observer—be willing to
attach normative force to the decisions that emerged from such a
system if the majority of the populace were Nazis? When we speak
in favor of “democracy” per se, are we simply assuming that such a
situation would never occur as a matter of moral luck or empirical
magic? Or, would we insist that there are some limits on the choices
that the populace can make? 
As a matter of our own historical experience as a nation, those
limits can be located in our written Constitution. Accordingly, we
regard judicial review as a part of the government process that
we—once again, as critical observers—find normatively acceptable.
But judicial review must be based on an interpretation of the
Constitution, and that interpretation, as argued above, should be
based on the basic purposes that animated the creation of that
foundational document.366 The advantage of this approach to
364. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 361, at 16-17.
365. DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 1 (3d ed. 1996); ALAIN TOURAINE, WHAT IS
DEMOCRACY 7 (David Macey trans., 1997).
366. See supra Part I.C.
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interpretation is that it incorporates respect for the electoral process
at the same time that it disciplines that process. With respect to the
PPACA, utilizing this approach means that the statute should be
regarded as a template for judicial decisions that clarify or extend
the PPACA’s operation.
The third objection to positive rights is philosophical; it is the
objection voiced by Isaiah Berlin, who developed the negative-
positive terminology.367 Berlin posited that negative rights give
people the liberty to do what they want, but positive rights tell them
what to do in the name of liberty.368 Like Rousseau’s theory of the
general will,369 Berlin’s idea assumes that people have a real or
authentic self that is not necessarily reflected in their actual
decisions. This then allows someone, possibly a ruler exercising a
monopoly of legitimate force, to compel people to take certain
actions against their present will because those actions appear to be
in their own best interest. As Berlin says, “this entails ... that [the
people] would not resist [the ruler] if they were rational and as wise
as [that ruler] and understood their interests”370 as that ruler did.
Once the ruler takes this view, Berlin goes on to say, the ruler is: 
in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to
bully, oppress, torture [the people] in the name ... of their “real”
selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of
man (happiness, performance of duty, wisdom, a just society,
self-fulfillment) must be identical with his freedom—the free
choice of his “true” albeit often submerged and inarticulate,
self.371 
This is a powerful statement that relates directly to the current
controversy over the PPACA. The thrust of the legal objections,
an explicit theme of the more general political opposition, and one
of the rallying cries of the Tea Party seems to be that the Act forces
people to do things they do not want to do out of a misplaced
sense of paternalism, a do-gooder intrusiveness on people’s real
367. BERLIN, supra note 85, at 121-22.
368. Id.
369. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 60, at 35, 38-39.
370. BERLIN, supra note 85, at 133.
371. Id. 
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freedom.372 Specifically, the criticism directed at the provision that
compels people to buy health insurance is based on an argument
that it is beyond the power of the federal government to compel
them to enter into private contracts.373 The two federal district
courts that have invalidated part or all of the Act have relied on this
rationale, although the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits reversed or
vacated these judgments.374 That rationale, moreover, would seem
to be supported by the argument proposed above, because it is
grounded on liberty, one of the constitutional purposes that has
been identified as a basis for positive rights.
But this philosophical objection fails, both in the specific context
of the PPACA and generally. The response in connection with the
PPACA is eminently nonphilosophical. The Act does not compel
people to do anything; it simply imposes a tax.375 The fact that the
tax is structured as an insurance contract is irrelevant; the basic
distinction is between paying money and performing some task that
involves specific allocations of time and external supervision. Robert
Nozick argues that a tax is forced labor because most people earn
their income from work.376 But this is close to being a play on words,
because paying a tax simply does not equate to being compelled to
perform a particular action; it is simply the contribution that
members of a society are required to make as individuals in order
to achieve their collective purposes. From the time that knights
bought their way out of the feudal obligations to perform military
service,377 the payment of money has always been understood in our
society as an alternative to compelled behavior, not a form of it.
372. See, e.g., RASMUSSEN & SCHOEN, supra note 16, at 13-14.
373. Robert Moffit, Obamacare and the Individual Mandate: Violating Personal Liberty and
Federalism, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/
2011/01/obamacare-and-the-individual-mandate-violating-personal-liberty-and-federalism;
see also Andrew MacKie-Mason, Individual Mandate and Individual Liberty, SOURCE 4
POLITICS (Feb. 16, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://source4politics.blogspot.com/2011/02/individual-
mandate-and-individual.html (“In their rhetoric and in the press, the opponents of the
mandate are employing the language of individual liberty. We need to strike down the
mandate, they argue, because if we don’t then Congress can dictate our entire lives.”).
374. See sources cited supra note 8.
375. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b), 124 Stat.
119, 243 (2010) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).
376. NOZICK, supra note 267, at 169.
377. This practice was referred to as scutage or a shield tax. See FRANCES GIES, THE
KNIGHT IN HISTORY 100-03 (1984).
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Although Quakers are not required to serve in the armed forces and
Christian Scientists cannot be compelled to receive medical care,378
Quakers cannot refuse to pay taxes used to support the armed
forces, and Christian Scientists cannot object to paying taxes that
provide health care services to those who choose to avail themselves
of such services. The liberty-based challenge is more appropriately
directed to compulsory vaccination programs or to the alleged “death
panels” that opponents claimed were in the Act in an effort to tap
into Berlin’s theme more directly.379
Quite apart from the specifics of the PPACA, however, Berlin’s
philosophical objection to positive rights does not apply to the
programs of a modern administrative state. Regulatory programs
are not designed to compel people to act against their wishes and in
accordance with the ruler’s concept of their better selves. Rather, in
a democratic system at least, the purpose of such programs is to
enable people to act collectively in a way that they are disem-
powered from acting individually. In some cases, individuals lack
the power to bargain with owners of capital, in other cases they lack
the knowledge to manage the complexities of the modern world, and,
in others, the problems are simply beyond the limits of any individ-
ual action. 
We do not like to concede the level of dependence that the modern
world has imposed on us in exchange for its many benefits, but our
dependence is beyond dispute. Most of us would be dead in a few
days if the water supply system of our nation failed. If it were in the
hands of a private entrepreneur who could threaten to cut off the
supply, he could compel us to give him our possessions, our houses,
and our children. Our inevitable dependence on others in this
complex, modern world is the real rationale behind the administra-
378. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (recognizing that conscientious
objectors may be exempted from military service based on personal codes of morality); see also
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (general right to refuse
unwanted medical care); Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (1914) (same).
379. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (recognizing right to refuse
treatment but upholding Massachusetts law requiring vaccination on grounds of compelling
state interest); Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, False ‘Death Panel’ Rumor Has Some
Familiar Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/14/health/policy/
14panel.html; Angie Drobnic Holan, PolitiFact’s Lie of the Year: ‘Death Panels,’ POLITIFACT
(Dec. 18, 2009, 5:15 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2009/dec/18/
politifact-lie-year-death-panels.
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tive state, not the desire to force people to act in the name of their
better or more authentic selves. 
CONCLUSION
If the courts were to recognize positive rights, they would not be
forcing people to do anything other than possibly paying more taxes.
Rather, they would be providing the people with guarantees that the
purposes of the Constitution will be fulfilled. Those purposes, as
their meaning has been revealed to us through time, changing
circumstances, and developing conceptions, now demand that every
American be provided with the basic necessities of life—food, shelter
and health care—and with education, the basic necessity to do any-
thing more than merely survive in this modern world. The PPACA,
considered by itself as a piece of legislation, represents an important
step in this direction. But the PPACA also represents a major
interpretation of the Constitution, demonstrating what statutes can
do when they comport with the Constitution’s purposes. As such, it
points forward to a new era of constitutional doctrine, an era when
positive rights will be recognized as part of the document’s essential
meaning. That is what makes some people so angry about it.
